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PSYCHO-ANALYSIS  
AND ITS  
DERIVATIVES

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## PREFACE

AN attempt is made in this volume to study psycho-analysis and its derivatives from an external and impartial point of view. It is certain that the author will be accused of prejudice. He hopes, however, that the protests will emanate from adherents of each of the schools involved in such measure as to cancel each other out. It is a fact, which many deplore, that the recent developments of psychology described in this book have been associated with a certain intolerance of criticism on the part of many adherents. This intolerance militates against any rational synthesis of the theories and doctrines concerned, and it is to be hoped that a more conciliatory spirit will manifest itself in the near future. If this volume makes a contribution, however modest, to such a future synthesis the author will be more than repaid.

His qualification for attempting this

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compilation lies in his position as director of an organization where psycho-therapists of all the schools work alongside of many who claim, like himself, to be eclectic. In that position he inevitably enjoys an unusual opportunity of comparing the practical results of different techniques.

The author's thanks are due to Sir J. Arthur Thomson for invaluable help and criticism, and to Dr. M. M. Lilley for assistance in correcting the proofs and compiling the Index.

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## INTRODUCTION

IN 1890, William James wrote to James Sully : <sup>11</sup> "It seems to me that psychology is like physics before Galileo's time—not a single elementary law yet caught a glimpse of. A great chance for some future psychologist to make a name greater than Newton's ; but who will then read the books of this generation ? Not many, I trow."

Some forty years later William McDougall gave it as his opinion that Freud had done more for the advancement of psychology than any student since Aristotle. It is reasonable to suppose that if James had lived to see the development of psycho-analysis he would have accepted Freud as the Newton that he looked for.

Under these circumstances some acquaintance with the nature and content of psycho-analysis becomes an essential part of general education. It is not, however, an easy matter to put into the hands of



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the layman a concise statement of a system which possesses already a vast bibliography—a system, moreover, that has undergone important modifications during the thirty years or so of its existence. Furthermore, it is a difficult task to set it forth in such a way as to make clear its points of contact and divergence with the various schools of thought which have emerged from it, notably those associated with the names of Jung and Adler. Hardest of all perhaps is the imperative duty of pointing out how and where these systems are compatible or incompatible with the general trend of modern science.

Psycho-analysis is not popular. Most people approach it with a definite prejudice. Freud attributes this to its most fundamental feature, determinism, whereby he has robbed man of "his most cherished illusion"—i.e. free-will. In other words, what goes on in the mind, as we say, illustrates certain stateable and verifiable uniformities, or "laws," just as is the case with the body. Others consider that the "pansexualism" of psycho-analysis is the real source of antagonism. That is to say, the theory regards "sex" as the dominant

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and central motive of life. The business of author and reader alike is to approach the subject with the least possible bias.<sup>1</sup> As we study the nature of psycho-analysis it will become clear that this bias is an inherent factor in the situation. For the present let it suffice to say that when anyone proposes to apply the methods of objective science to the subjective life of man, there must inevitably be a bias against the scientific dignity of the study. That this bias is not necessarily unfavourable to the inquiry will be pointed out in a later chapter. For most readers, however, the tendency will be to assume a resistant attitude towards a system that appears to impoverish their personality and devalue their motives in life. It is this resistance which the Freudians claim can only be eliminated by undergoing the experience of psycho-analysis. And it is this resistance which the reader must endeavour to replace by that "benevolent scepticism" which is all that Freud himself asks for. Let him remember that when Sigmund Freud began his work psychology was little more than a sterile compromise between neurology and meta-

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physics. Within his lifetime the study of human behaviour has become vital and fruitful, albeit somewhat turbulent at times. Whatever mistakes may presently appear to the reader, and whatever misconceptions may ultimately be discarded in future development, nothing can take away from Freud a position no less unique than that which physical science gives to Newton. And the fact that Newton has found his Einstein is a point which may suitably be borne in mind—not to justify derogation but rather to temper dogmatism. For, if the truth be told, some, if not much, of the popular resistance to psycho-analysis originates in the dogmatism, not of Freud, but of his followers. To them he has given a “scientific method” with which to explore the spirit of man. It should be no cause for wonder if the user of the scientific method errs on the side of dogmatism, nor yet if the subject of this exploration be inclined to protest against such dogmatism.

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## CHAPTER I

### PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (FREUD)

(1) *The Nature of Psycho-analysis.* Psycho-analysis means two things and two only. The first is the technique devised by Freud for investigating the human mind or the subjective aspect of our life. The second is the body of theory which has emerged from the data thus collected. If we respect the history of terms, no system which diverges from the Freudian can correctly be called psycho-analysis. For purposes of differentiation Jung uses the term Analytical psychology (which happens to be a plagiarism from Stout) and Adler calls his system Individual psychology, although, as a matter of fact, of the three systems his lays most stress on social relations.

Freud approached the problem of human behaviour with an inflexible conception of causality. Every phenomenon must have

an antecedent cause, whether the phenomenon be psychic or physical. This "thorough-going determinism" is the basic feature of the Freudian approach to every mental problem. On this account Freud claims to be the first psychologist who has adhered to the scientific (or, we might say, the naturalistic) method. He points out that all previous psychologists have been content to fill in the gaps in their solutions by surmises or else by data derived from introspection. In short, Freud claims that he is able to study subjective phenomena precisely as if they were objective. If he is correct in his assumption that the subjective life can be adequately explained by objective methods, most, if not all, of his theory is incontrovertible, for Freud is above all things an honest and logical thinker. If, on the other hand, his fundamental assumption is rejected, it is clearly possible to make reservations in the Freudian theory or to discard it *in toto* as we feel inclined.

Psycho-analysis deals for the most part with the unconscious mind. At the time that Freud began his investigations the question was still being hotly debated

whether or no mind could be unconscious, and whether the phrase "unconscious mind" was not a contradiction in terms.

Many psychologists of that day were content with recognizing an unimportant partner of the conscious mind which they called the subconscious or the co-conscious. But Freud soon announced that, as regards extent and importance, the conscious mind is far inferior to the unconscious mind. Furthermore, Freud at the very outset pointed out that the material in the unconscious is largely at variance with or incompatible with the content of the conscious mind. Hitherto psychologists had given a somewhat grudging recognition to a "subconscious" which held the lumber of the mind as and when it fell out of active use. Or else they had recognized it as a special department which assumed importance in morbid cases of dual personality. To Freud, on the other hand, the unconscious is, and always has been, the major and more important portion of the psyche.

But there was yet another difference between the academic psychology of the day and Freud's primary discoveries.



Whereas the mental life had been conceived largely in static terms with energy concentrated in the "will," Freud showed that the content of the mind, conscious and unconscious alike, is potentially dynamic, and that apart from the knowledge of the individual there are urges and resistances, preferences and aversions, fears and aspirations which maintain tensions between themselves. Furthermore, they are responsible not only for the resistance to investigation by the analyst, but also for the fact that they have been repressed or driven out of consciousness. Psycho-analysis, therefore, offers to mankind a new sort of knowledge that he is not likely to welcome. It is a knowledge of his own mental life unrecognizably different from that which he imagines it to be.

One of the stock objections to psycho-analysis is that it imputes to the normal the failings of the neurotic. It is said that psycho-analysts spend their lives in dealing with abnormal people, and that in this way they obtain a distorted view of normal humanity. Perhaps the best answer to this objection is that the maladjustments of the neurotic consist to a great extent of

childish attitudes and strivings which he has never outgrown. The material thus obtained has much in common with the material obtainable from a child who is likely to become a normal adult. The normal adult has outgrown childish difficulties; the neurotic has failed to do so. The objection is therefore based upon a fundamental misconception of the neurotic as a creature apart, who shares none of the characteristics of the normal individual.


(2) *The Structure of the Mind.* There are two fundamental concepts to be recognized in the structure or topography of psychoanalysis. The first is that of the conscious, preconscious and unconscious. The second came many years later in the development of Freud's theory. It is that of the *Ego*, the *Id* and the *Super-Ego*. These two concepts overlap to some extent and in consequence they present a somewhat complex arrangement.

The accompanying diagram may help to elucidate the description attempted in this chapter. Let us suppose a mountain ridge and a valley. Owing to the presence of a higher mountain the sun never penetrates into the valley. The two peaks are exposed

to the full sunlight. Lower down they have sun only at midday or in summer. The best-illuminated zone represents the conscious, the less illuminated the pre-conscious, and the valley which has no direct sunlight is the unconscious. The main peak is the Ego, the more slender one is the Super-Ego and the massive ridge is the Id. Both the Super-Ego and the Ego function in consciousness and in the pre-conscious. Each of them has an unconscious base. The Id functions only in the unconscious. It is primarily to the unconscious that all mental dynamism belongs.

Freud's justification for attributing such importance to the unconscious may be summarized as follows :

- ✓ (1) The predominant content of the mind in relation to the amount which is in consciousness at any given moment.
- ✓ (2) The incompatibility of many conscious and unconscious motives.
- ✓ (3) The evidence of post-hypnotic phenomena.
- ✓ (4) The emergence of ideas, memories and even solutions of problems, indicating that mental processes have been proceeding without awareness.



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(5) The evidence of dream interpretation.

(6) The evidence derived from the psycho-pathology of everyday life—slips of speech, misspells, false actions, etc.

(7) The therapeutic success that rewards treatment based on the assumption that the unconscious is predominantly important.

These seven points merit amplification.

(1) It must be obvious, on reflection, that the total number of ideas stored in the mind is vastly in excess of those that can occupy consciousness at any given moment; that is to say, that by an effort of memory we recall endless ideas and direct consciousness to them. But one of Freud's earliest observations, though it cannot actually be attributed to him as an original discovery, was that beyond the ordinary zone of memory there was a zone in which ideas were stored and experiences registered that could not be recalled by any ordinary act of recollection. The difference between these two categories is represented by the preconscious and the unconscious. Thus a simple idea such as a date in history can be recalled by an act of memory. When this is unsuccessful, it can sometimes be recalled by some special technique such as

free association or hypno-analysis. This proves that the idea though neither in the conscious nor in the preconscious actually persisted in the unconscious. If therefore there are far more ideas in the preconscious—i.e. in the ordinary storehouse of memory—than in the conscious, how many more may there be in the unconscious beyond the ordinary powers of memory to recover? But this observation of the vastness of the total mental content in relation to the mere content of consciousness, is comparatively unimportant. What is of fundamental importance is that the ideas in the preconscious and unconscious may be fraught with emotional significance. Anyone can by an ordinary act of memory recall an idea or an experience which inclines him to laugh or cry or which evokes feelings of terror or remorse. Therefore ideas in the preconscious can be charged with emotion. Freud found that, in the same way, ideas in the unconscious could be and very frequently were fraught with feeling. By special methods he found that he could bring into consciousness ideas that were so deeply buried that both the actual memory and the nature of the

feeling tone were completely cut off from the individual's conscious life.

(2) The incompatibility of many conscious and unconscious motives can often be demonstrated in such states of modified ideation as anæsthesia and somnambulism. Thus the man who, as he is succumbing to a general anæsthetic, murmurs something about murdering his wife, has unconscious ideas that are not compatible with conscious thoughts. The somnambulist woman who leaves her room screaming for help is the prey of feelings which have no counterpart in consciousness.

(3) It has long been known that it is possible to suggest to a hypnotized subject that he will perform an act after the lapse of so many days or hours or in association with some future eventuality. The subject on being awakened is unaware of the injunction, yet when the time comes he will perform the act as suggested. It is obvious that the suggestion was not in the preconscious, still less in the conscious, but actually buried in the unconscious until the suggested association caused it to emerge.

(4) It is within the experience of every-

one that lost memories will return to consciousness by spontaneous association, although they had defeated every active effort of recollection. Many people have had the experience of solving a practical, or it may be even a mathematical, problem during sleep.

✓(5) The evidence of dream interpretation we owe practically entirely to Freud. It was he who first recognized that the fantastic medley of incoherent ideation that constitutes the average dream, may be susceptible of interpretation, and that so interpreted it bears witness to vast psychic activity beyond the frontier of normal awareness.

(6) Freud drew attention to the numerous examples of simple mistakes which could not properly be regarded as fortuitous. Thus it is not a mere matter of chance that allows a man to forget to post a letter containing a reluctant payment when he has never failed to post letters of a pleasanter content. Misspells often represent a buried feeling and may sometimes lead to embarrassment. A young Scotsman who had strong aspirations for a political career in the Conservative interest meant to write



Calton Hill, Edinburgh, and did not notice that he had written Carlton. A young woman who had reason to complain of her stepmother's lack of affection, wrote "mère de glace," when her familiarity with the French language should have ensured her spelling correctly the name of the famous glacier. A young woman entered her name in the visitors' book of an hotel incorrectly. Instead of her own surname she wrote the surname she hoped to achieve, though the man who owned the surname had not yet made a proposal of marriage. As he was a member of the party and saw what she had written, considerable embarrassment resulted. Such examples afford proof of the substitution of a purpose which is divergent from the constant purpose of the moment. This represents a wish that is stronger than the wish being expressed. It stands therefore for mental activity which plans, as it were, to defeat the conscious purpose of the moment.

(7) The final evidence of the importance of unconscious elements in the mind is based upon the success of such treatment as is conducted upon that assumption. Were the Freudian theory completely

erroneous, it is irrational to suppose that such treatment would have met with success even remotely comparable to what has been achieved.

At first Freud regarded the unconscious as being purely autogenic—i.e. its content derived entirely from the individual's experience. This was amplified by adding ante-natal experience, and later a racial source was included, i.e. elements in the unconscious were attributed to phylogenesis or racial evolution. (This extension was not made, however, till some years after Jung's insistence on the concept of the racial unconscious.) The emergence of ideas from the unconscious can only take place by the breaking down of the repressing obstruction, and this process belongs to the technique of psychoanalysis. From the preconscious to the conscious ideas can pass by ordinary channels of association. When an idea is held back in the preconscious, it is assumed that some association with a repressed idea exists, thereby causing an indirect obstruction. Freud's conception of the preconscious is in many respects identical with Morton Prince's co-conscious. Each

has a general character of accessibility without awareness. At an early stage Freud described a censor which he located in the preconscious and which was supposed to guard the conscious zone from the intrusion of repressed (and therefore unwelcome) ideas. Later a censor was postulated between the preconscious and unconscious as well as one between the preconscious and conscious. Later the emphasis was transferred in some measure to the relationship of the Super-Ego and of the Id to the Ego. It is hardly to be wondered at that the conception of censorship—implying choice and discrimination—within a determinate psychic life was regarded by some critics as verging on the paradoxical. It seemed as though Freud, strenuously denying freedom of choice to the individual, came very near to re-instating it in the censorship. In any case the term “censorship” is highly metaphorical; it represents some sort of selective inhibition.

Some of the chief characteristics of the unconscious are the following:

- / (1) It is entirely a-moral, and ruthlessly egocentric.

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- ✓ (2) It is timeless.
- ✓ (3) It is uninfluenced by negation.
- ✓ (4) It is dominated by the pleasure-pain principle.
- ✓ (5) Its energy is easily transferred from one idea to another.
- ✓ (6) It is non-verbalized, i.e. an unconscious idea cannot reach even the pre-conscious unless and until it has a verbal representation attached to it.
- (7) It is illogical.
- (8) It is infantile and largely sexual.

(It is not by any means clear how far Freud's present conception of the unconscious permits of affective (or emotional) elements in its content.)

It may thus be seen that the unconscious represents within each of us the infant, the primitive man and also the animal. The whole work of racial culture and individual education only serves to reclaim the sunlit zone of our diagram. Below that there is a chaotic activity of which the man on the sunlit peak knows nothing and cares less. Now and again he hurls an unworthy idea down into the obscure depths, never to see it again. He can, however, be aware of consequences, for the affect attached to a

repressed idea regains consciousness in an unattached and therefore undifferentiated form.

If we now turn to the concept of the Ego, the Id and Super-Ego, we may consider the diagram horizontally instead of vertically. The main eminence is the Id (*das Es* in German). This represents the chief impersonal dynamic and the source of mental energy. It is difficult to understand to what extent the instinctive life is restricted to the Id. Much of it obviously is directly accessible to consciousness. This must energize it directly. Yet the Id is described as "the source of instinctive energy for the individual." In other ways the Id is described in terms that are to a great extent identical with those applied to the unconscious. Yet it would be a mistake to imagine that the two are co-terminous. The subject, however, is inherently so difficult that the reader must be tolerant of a certain amount of confusion. Rank—whose actual status in the psycho-analytical school is somewhat equivocal—has tried to cut the Gordian knot by stating that the concept of the unconscious has become "superfluous, even confusing." But the Gordian

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knots of life cannot be cut, most of them "must be patiently unravelled." And this phrase seems to be a happy description of Freud's own methods.

The following attributes of the Id are common to it and to the unconscious :

(1) It is unconscious.

(2) It is a-moral.

(3) It is dominated by the pleasure-pain principle.

(4) It is illogical.

(5) It contains all repressed ideas.

(6) It contains all phylogenetic deposits, that is to say, enregistrements of racial evolution.

Other attributes are the following :

(7) It is the great reservoir of the libido or "love-energy."

(8) The life and death conflicts are carried on within it.

(9) It appears to be the seat of all the instincts, which are ready-made inborn capacities of effective behaviour.

(10) All habit-formation resides within it.

Let us emphasize once more that the two conceptions (Id and unconscious) are not interchangeable. There are portions of the unconscious which belong to the

Ego, and others which belong to the Super-Ego. These, nevertheless, are conceived as small in amount in relation to the Id content, all of which is permanently unconscious.

The Ego is in certain ways the antithesis of the Id, while in other ways the Super-Ego affords the contrast. The Ego is derived from the Id passing through the preconscious in infancy and childhood. It is said that the differentiation chiefly takes place in the first year, but that it is not complete till puberty.

The attributes of the Ego may be summarized as follows :

- (1) It is conscious.
- (2) It is logical.
- (3) It deals with percepts, reality and the outer world.
- (4) It is autonomous (i.e. sufficient unto itself). On the other hand, it is said to be ruled by the Super-Ego.
- (5) It acts as an intermediary between three sets of forces.
  - (a) External reality.
  - (b) Instinctive pressure from the Id.
  - (c) Inhibition or control from the Super-Ego.
- (6) It adopts moral standards.

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- (7) It recognizes time relations.
- (8) It is verbalized.
- ✓ (9) It sleeps but maintains a dream censorship.

The Super-Ego may be roughly described as the earliest moral code of the child. The following are its chief characteristics :

- (1) It is an outcrop of the Ego.
- (2) It rules the Ego.
- (3) It is largely inaccessible to the Ego.
- (4) Less of it is in consciousness than in the case of the Ego.

(5) It is in close contact with the Id.

(6) It is closely associated with the phylogenetic or racial heritage.

(7) It comprises the "Œdipus complex" and other early affective or emotional bonds, with their respective reaction trends. It owes its origin mainly to the parent of the same sex.

(8) It is the moral critic that maintains in the Ego an unconscious guilt sense. The defensive response of the Ego is to repress this guilt sense.

(9) It has been equated with conscience though it has also been stated that "it is much more moral than the conscience we are familiar with."



(10) It is the outcome of the child's co-existent desires—to love and to be loved, to indulge itself and yet be approved of.

With this we must conclude our very brief outline of the structure of psycho-analysis. Much of it will become clearer in the light of what has to follow on the dynamics of the system.

(3) *The Libido*. It has already been pointed out that one of the great merits of Freud's theory is the conception of energy at work throughout the whole psychic system. Reference has been made to urges, impulses and repressing forces. We shall now attempt to discuss these very briefly.

The libido is defined by Freud as "the energy of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word 'love.'"

Such instinctive forces as remained apart from the libido he formerly ranked under the heading of "Ego-instincts." The libidinal trends had an external objective while the ego-impulses were mainly self-preservative. Subsequently this conception underwent some modification, as we shall see. Meantime, let us study this primary grouping.

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The libido is obviously something much wider than is familiarly known as the sex urge. The frequent modern usage which keeps the two close together emanates from Freud's claim that we cannot separate from sexual love "on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children, friendship, and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and abstract ideas. Our justification," he continues, "lies in the fact that psycho-analytic research has taught us that all these tendencies are an expression of the same instinctive activities."

It may be useful to note here that Jung makes use of the term libido in a much broader sense—something that represents *the total strivings of the individual*. As such it is exactly analogous to Bergson's *élan vital* or to McDougall's *hormé*.

Freud's conception of the libido has given rise to keen opposition and criticism. He has been accused of "reducing everything to sex," of "pansexualism" and so on. What would have been more justifiable criticism of the earlier form of the theory is that he reduced everything to "sex or self." B. Hinkle remarks—not

without justice—that Freud “apparently identifies the pleasure principle and the sexual instinct and considers that the former is primarily rooted in the latter.”

Later on, as we shall see, he enlarged the sex activities to include a considerable proportion of the self activities, while later still he introduced the life and death impulses. But what has occasioned much of the outcry about Freud’s sexual theory is his extension of it to the life of the child. The popular conception of the sex-life as beginning at puberty and ending at the climacteric, and as relating solely to procreation and the hedonic satisfactions associated with it—all this had to be discarded. Freud pointed out that the infant of a few days already has a “sexual” life in that he derives satisfaction from the act of sucking. Later his excretory functions afford him similar gratification. In course of time his interest becomes concentrated in genital activity. Freud claims to have traced the connections between all such activities and the numerous manifestations of “love” referred to above. It is natural that an unenlightened public should resent the imputation of sexuality

or "filth" or "naughtiness" to the innocent child, but it must be remembered that our civilization has been laboriously at work for thousands of years in establishing the family on a monogamic basis. Its chief method in pursuing this important objective has been to surround the procreative function with every conceivable taboo, restriction and penalty. Hence when Freud attributes sexuality to a seemingly "innocent" child, he has said nothing which would be in his eyes a condemnation. He has only pointed out that this beautiful rose owes its fragrance and charm to the excretory matter that the gardener has applied to its roots. This is Freud's concern. No phenomenon, according to his assumption, is without an antecedent cause, and the manure is the—or an—antecedent cause of the beauty of the rose. Instead of giving vent to shrill denunciations of Freud and his discoveries, it would be more reasonable if we accepted his findings, and pointed out, perhaps, the æsthetic value of the rose, its relation to other roses in the garden, its protection from frost and similar considerations appertaining to its present and future relations

to the external world. The fact of the matter is that the sexual code of civilization has been developed on obscurantist lines, and any beam of scientific light was bound to cause disturbance. At the same time it must be admitted that Freud with his ruthless logic and complete detachment from consequences has always played the rôle of iconoclast. It may be that he played it purely from a sense of duty. In one passage he writes : " I like to avoid concessions to faint-heartedness." On the other hand, it is certain that many of his followers have played the rôle with undisguised gusto. Freud's own position in the matter he states thus : " We are not reformers, it is true ; we are merely observers ; but we cannot avoid observing with critical eyes, and we have found it impossible to give our support to conventional sexual morality or to approve highly of the means by which society attempts to arrange the practical problems of sexuality in life. We can demonstrate with ease that what the world calls its code of morals demands more sacrifices than it is worth, and that its behaviour is neither dictated by honesty nor instituted with

wisdom. We do not absolve our patients from listening to these criticisms; we accustom them to an unprejudiced consideration of sexual matters like all other matters; and if, after they have become independent by the effect of the treatment, they choose some intermediate course between unrestrained sexual licence and unconditional asceticism, our conscience is not burdened whatever the outcome." It is obvious that an attitude such as this, can, in the hands of the less mature and responsible psycho-analysts, constitute an active challenge to what are regarded by some as the fundamentals of social progress.

There is another consideration which should serve to silence or at least to temper our protests. We have, after all, an animal ancestry and our bodies bear witness to this in a thousand ways. Our psyche has been developed out of the animal's reflex and instinctive equipment. It would be idle to suppose that this psycho-neural heritage has vanished, and in so far as it is excluded from the higher zones of the human psyche we must expect to find it represented in the unconscious. Externally, man has lost the caudal appendage

and he may pride himself in its practical absence if he be so disposed. But he must not be shocked by the discovery that within his abdomen he carries a vermiform appendix which has no significance except as an ancestral vestige. Similarly, while he may congratulate himself on the relative absence of animal traits in his conscious mental life, he must accept calmly the evidence of his psychological ancestry as revealed in his unconscious.

Discarding, therefore, as much prejudice as we can over the alleged "pansexualism," let us study more closely Freud's theory of the libido. The following points are of cardinal importance :

(1) The libido is always present, even in the infant. His sexuality is described as "partial libidinal impulses."

(2) It varies in intensity in different individuals at different ages and under varying physiological conditions.

(3) It can be stimulated through various zones which are termed "erotogenic." These zones are associated with nutrition, excretion and procreation. The sensitization of these zones results in a demand for appropriate stimulation. By the end of

the fifth year the process of "localization" is complete.

The early development of the libido has been the subject of very wide study by psycho-analysts. By infantile sexuality Freud means that "Every child is born with an organically determined 'sexual' excitability." This can most readily be studied between the ages of three and five. It is primitive, egocentric and entirely asocial. Very soon the child recognizes the disapproval of adults evoked by his activities. Anxieties arise and this is the beginning of repression. Jones states that "Every adult problem in the realm of sexuality" is "capable of full explanation only in the light of our newly gained knowledge concerning the early stages in the development of this complicated instinct."

The following are the main features of the child's development :

(1) Erotic stimulability is one of the infant's chief characteristics. Libidinal gratification dictates much of his behaviour.

(2) He is full of self-importance and self-love. He is constantly compensating for his acute feelings of helplessness by exploiting his potencies.



interests of the child give him direct gratification and their survival value is individual; that is to say, they subserve the end of safeguarding the individual's growth and preservation by making the functions of nutrition and excretion pleasurable. In maturity these gratifications should become secondary to the hedonic factor in procreation, for procreation is directed to the growth and preservation of the species. Adolescence is the period of transition and during that period it would appear that the instinctive gratification of the nutritional and excretory functions are used to enhance the interest in the procreative function. Thus the instinctive urge which is ultimately destined for the service of the species is first made attractive in terms of the urges which are essentially concerned with the individual's welfare only. It is interesting to speculate on the factors that may have influenced these instinctive forms of gratification. For instance, the relation of oral interest to nutritional opportunity. The poet may ask "Irks care the maw-crammed bird?" but the evolutionist may ask whether the maw-crammed bird is not

the one with ample opportunity of feeding itself and the greatest capacity for oral gratification, while the bird that is always concerned to obtain a sufficiency of food needs only the pangs of hunger to stimulate it. Similarly, the competitive interests of procreation and nutrition may be associated in certain species with seasonal fluctuations. It is thus possible to think of the various instinctive gratifications of the human adolescent as a progressive eclipsing of those activities which concerned his individual well-being by those which concern the well-being of the species.

In connection with these three phases of infantile and adolescent eroticism three types of character have been described. Great importance has of recent years been attached to this study, which has evoked an unusual amount of hostility from the critics. Some readers will feel that this hostility is not surprising.

The normal character is defined by one writer as "an organized series of behaviour reactions which secure equilibrium between Id tendencies and surrender to reality. These reactions begin in the period of infantile sexuality and form a continuous

series of adaptations.” Another writer points out that “the normal man has no sense of guilt.” On the other hand, the oral and anal types of character fall far short of these standards. The oral type is divided into two sub-classes: (*a*) those that have experienced marked and undisturbed pleasure in sucking, (*b*) those who have experienced thwarting or difficulty in the process. The first group are said to be optimists, carefree, finding pleasure in taking—in fact, rather like Mr. Micawber. The second type is impatient, demanding and dependent. Pessimism is also attributed to this type, though Freud himself places it in the next group. The anal character, so called, also has two aspects. The first depends on pleasure in the act of defæcation and the second on pleasure in the fæcal material itself. According to Freud, there are three primary features of the anal character.

(1) Orderliness (bodily cleanliness, reliability, conscientiousness in performance of petty duties)—which may amount to pedantry.

(2) Parsimony which may amount to avarice.

(3) Obstinacy which may develop into defiance, irascibility or vindictiveness.

The first of these characteristics emanates from the dominant desire to secure parental approval by being the "good, clean little fellow." Also the regularity in bowel functioning which is expected of the child by some mothers tends to produce in the Super-Ego an over-emphasis on punctilious and punctual performance. But the child naturally derives a certain gratification from the act of defæcation. This can be enhanced by postponement. The combination occurs, therefore, of refusing to yield to maternal exhortations and deriving therefrom instinctive gratification. It is possible to think of excretion in terms of a very early development of the Ego. The first way in which an infant can influence its environment is by crying. This is an instinctive reflex which can be conditioned within certain limits and which can pass into a conscious act of volition. The second way in which it can influence its environment is by biting the nipple. In this the idea of the Ego and the non-Ego is supposed to arise, but it is to be noted that there is always a danger in

attributing a psychological significance to behaviour that has its exact analogy in lower species. Furthermore, during the age of suckling the child's capacity for conceptual thinking is presumably minimal. On the other hand, this capacity is more marked during the second year of life when the question arises of bowel control. It is thus enabled, we may imagine, to generalize on the effect which its behaviour exerts upon the mother. It comes to the conclusion that it has the power to please or displease by purposive control of excretory activity. Hence this function becomes the first in regard to which the child can generalize on the pattern of the Id-Ego-Super-Ego situation. Thus the Id prompts the child to defæcate, i.e. its instinctive desire is to do so. The Super-Ego is opposed, i.e. at such a time and place Mother would be vexed. The Ego then has to balance the two, i.e. by exercising control I gain Mother's approval, but by following my natural impulse I obtain physical relief of tension. This is the basic plan of the relationship. But in seeking a compromise solution—which is ever the quest of the Ego—the child

discovers the sensory pleasure of volitional postponement of excretion. In this discovery it has made its first step towards neurosis. It has devised a means of satisfying the Super-Ego while it derives simultaneously a certain—partial or substitutive—instinctive gratification.

The other situation is as follows: The child is called upon to excrete at the appointed time and in the appointed way. The Id prompts it to defæcate because it happens to want to. The Super-Ego also desires this—i.e. Mother is cajoling, solicitous or menacing. The Ego realizes that by resisting the instinctive urge to excrete it can produce a profound impression on the adult—vexation, disappointment or even despair. This is the first recognition on the part of the Ego that by abstinence (i.e. resisting an instinctive demand) it can exercise power (i.e. make Mother unhappy).

Now if the association of pleasure with postponement be established (as in the first example), then we get the situation in which abstinence produces both physical gratification and social importance. Hence the Ego in thwarting the Super-Ego may derive the same gratification as, in the

other case, the Ego derived from placating the Super-Ego.

Hence these unconscious instinctive demands become associated with characteristic attitudes that are said to persist throughout life. It is not to be wondered at that the human infant has an obvious interest in his excrement. That is a familiar phenomenon among animals. It was left to Freud to point out the way in which this interest in the child (technically called coprophilia) may be correlated with character-traits such as parsimony. One very important point is the association of cruelty with the anal character. It is by no means clear why this should be so, but empirically psycho-analysts are wont to connect the anal character with sadism (which denotes the active or passive enjoyment of the infliction of suffering in connection with libidinal stimulation). Thus reference is often made to the "anal-sadistic" type or character.

The obstinacy due to anal retention can express itself in many ways, notably the following :

(1) Self-willed independence, an attitude of superiority or of so-called "omnipot-

tence," the belief that no one can be trusted to do things as well as himself, or that no one possesses such valuable things as himself.

(2) Resentment against interference, insisting on one's own rights, and in general an individualistic attitude. Here again one can think of the child that is being trained in bowel control feeling resentment against the injunction which impels him to resist a simple organic impulse. Anyone, who has attempted to "train to the house" a puppy, must realize that his appealing whinings at the door represent the protest of organic demands against the reality principle—to wit the whipping which will follow if he yields to his impulses. We can imagine the Ego of the human infant protesting against this infringement of his freedom to yield to organic gratification, and perhaps we may imagine here the unconscious formula, "I shan't be interfered with when I am big enough."

(3) A "managing" disposition—laying down rules for others and, in general, an undue absorption in thwarting others. This can be understood as an over-compensation or reaction formation. "I



wasn't allowed to make messes when I wanted to, and now I shall see that other people don't make messes."

In connection with the parsimony which is Freud's second cardinal characteristic the following points may be noted :

(1) Saving small sums and spending large—forgetting small debts (presumably in people who remember large ones).

(2) A distaste for wasting time or effort.

(3) A grudging attitude connected with some things combined with liberality in others. Here it is supposed that the subjects in connection with which stinginess is manifested symbolically represent fæces. Books, food and time are all given as examples.

(4) Collecting is supposed to indicate the anal character since it expresses both the qualities of orderliness and retention.

One writer in contrasting the oral and anal characters, specifies the following points. The former is hasty, restless and impatient while the latter is persevering and persistent ; the oral is accessible to new ideas, whereas the anal is definitely conservative. The anal may also be reticent, aloof and morose.

# PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (FREUD)

The following table of the character qualities connected with anal-eroticism is taken from Professor Flügel's *Introduction to Psycho-Analysis*, page 110.

## *Displacements and Sublimations*

Retention	{	1. Postponement	
		2. Defiance	
		3. Obstinacy	
		4. Miserliness	
		5. Love of possessions	
		6. Desire to collect	
		7. Dislike of waste	
Production	{	8. Concentration (especially after postponement)	
		9. Generosity	
		10. Extravagance	
		11. Contamination	
		12. Untidiness	
		13. Noise (music)	
		14. Leaving mark	} sadistic
		15. Destruction	
		16. Speech	
		17. Writing	
		18. Painting	
Manipulation	{	19. Moulding	
		20. Cooking	
		21. Chemistry	
		22. Photography	
		23. Building	
		24. Engineering	

## PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND ITS DERIVATIVES

- Products { 25. Child  
26. Money  
27. Papers

### *Reaction-Formations*

- Orderliness { 28. Tidiness  
29. Organization  
30. Pedantry  
31. Clear thinking  
32. Thoroughness  
33. Punctuality

- Cleanliness { 34. Washing  
35. Cleaning  
36. Preventing accumulation  
37. Fear of contamination (e.g. of self  
or "Nature")  
38. "Purity"  
39. Reality

- Control { 40. Strong will (resisting temptation)  
41. Asceticism

If we turn now to the "genital character" we find that, as we should expect, it represents maturity, or rather comprises maturity, for as we shall presently see the attainment of the genital level by no means ensures a "normal" character. Abraham states that the pregenital components of character (i.e. oral and anal) having their bases in the organism, can never be "entirely surmounted or com-

pletely liberated " though they should be greatly modified or eliminated when the genital level is attained. In the final, i.e. genital, stage only those elements of the two first stages should be retained which make for social adaptation. Thus, from the early oral stage arise optimism and energy, from the anal stage comes endurance, and from the sadistic sources enough "drive" to ensure effectiveness.

One might be tempted to imagine that after passing successfully through all the difficulties of the oral and anal stages the child would be in quiet waters when the genital stage had been attained. But this is quite the reverse of what is said to occur.

It is to be observed that three stages have been noted in localization—i.e. oral, anal and genital. But there are also three stages in direction of the libido. The first is termed auto-erotic, the second narcissan and the third allo-erotic. In the first of these the child is lover and loved one together; the process belongs to the activities of the Id. Gradually, as self-awareness dawns, a differentiation takes place, and as a result the child is capable of directing his own libidinal demands

towards his own person. This he is encouraged to do by the recognition of the outer world and his own relative impotence. For this impotence he compensates by directing his libido inwards and finding satisfactions within himself. This capacity for self-love—narcissism—none of us entirely loses throughout life. What matters, however, is the extent to which the child succeeds in detaching his libido from himself and directing it to an external love-object—that object being in the first place the mother. During adolescence a comparable narcissistic stage is regarded as normal, and once more the demand is made to detach the libido from the Ego and let it flow to a love-object without. The external manifestation of narcissism is the acceptance from other persons of proofs of love without giving any in return.

To make plainer the difference between auto-erotism and narcissism a further explanation may be helpful. Both terms mean self-love, but an arbitrary differentiation has been adopted. Auto-erotism, strictly speaking, is a simple stimulation and response of the body, and as such

should be applicable to animals as well as to human beings. Narcissism may find expression in auto-erotic practices, but can exist without any such physical manifestation. It cannot, however, be divorced from the concept of personality. It may be as well to note also that narcissism must not be confused with ego-ism. Indeed, according to Freud, narcissism is "the libidinous complement" of ego-ism. He points out the possibility of the apparently paradoxical situation of the egoist who "still maintains strong interest in libido-objects."

The third phase in the direction of the libido is allo-erotic, i.e. the libido seeks an external love-object. Jones says: "The child seeks in the outer world for objects not only of its affection, but also of its conscious and unconscious sexual phantasies. It is inevitable that this should at first relate to those nearest to it, the members of its own family. Difficulties arise, however, when the phantasies indulged in with members of its own generation begin to be transferred to those of the older generation, principally the parents. This constitutes the famous Œdipus complex in which there

is a sexual attitude on the part of the child towards the parent of the opposite sex, together with rivalry towards the one of its own; commonly enough there is also present an inverted Œdipus complex where the reverse of this holds. This complex Freud regards as the central one in the whole unconscious; on the way in which the child deals with it depends, more than on anything else, its future character and temperament as well as any neurosis it may at any time develop. It is the most characteristic and important finding in all psycho-analysis, and against it is directed the whole strength of the individual's resistances as well as the external criticism of psycho-analysis. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that whatever manifold form this resistance may take, and whatever aspect of psycho-analysis is being criticized, it is the Œdipus complex that is finally responsible. All other conclusions of psycho-analytical theory are grouped around this complex, and by the truth of this finding psycho-analysis stands or falls." Freud writes: "Distinct traces are probably to be found in most people of an early partiality on

the part of a daughter for her father or on the part of a son for his mother; but it must be assumed to be more intense from the very first in the case of those children whose constitution marks them down for a neurosis, who develop prematurely and have a craving for love." Elsewhere Freud writes: "We recognize a tendency for those of the same sex to become alienated, daughter from mother and father from son. The daughter sees in her mother the authority which imposes limits to her will, whose task it is to bring her to that renunciation of sexual freedom which society demands; in certain cases, too, the mother is still a rival, who objects to being set aside. The same thing is repeated still more blatantly between father and son. To the son the father is the embodiment of the social compulsion to which he so unwillingly submits, the person who stands in the way of his following his own will, of his early sexual pleasures and, when there is family property, of his enjoyment of it. . . . The relation between father and daughter or mother and son would seem less liable to disaster; the latter relation furnishes the purest examples of



unchanging tenderness, undisturbed by any egoistic considerations. . . . There is nothing to wonder at, therefore, if the dreams of a great number of people bring to light the wish for the removal of their parents, especially of the parent whose sex is the same as the dreamer's. . . . It is rarely that hostility reigns alone—far more often it yields to more tender feelings which finally suppress it, when it has to wait in abeyance till a dream shows it, as it were, in isolation. . . . We also find this death-wish where there is no basis for it in real life, and where the adult would never have to confess to entertaining it in his waking life. The reason for this is that the deepest and most common motive for estrangement, especially between parent and child of the same sex, came into play in the earliest years of childhood.

“I refer to that rivalry of affections in which sexual elements are plainly emphasized. The son, when quite a little child, already begins to develop a peculiar tenderness towards his mother, whom he looks upon as his own property, regarding his father in the light of a rival who disputes this sole possession of his; similarly the

little daughter sees in her mother someone who disturbs her tender relation to her father and occupies a place which she feels she herself could very well fill."

In the case of the boy the genesis of the Œdipus complex is more explicable than in that of the girl. The attachment to the mother (or mother-substitute, as the case may be) has already been formed on a basis of dependence. When the boy enters the phallic stage of libido development, it is comprehensible that she should become the love-object. With the girl it would appear that she takes the mother for her love-object just as the boy does. But when she realizes her anatomical deficiency she must "slip into a new position and take the father as love-object."

To the Œdipus has been joined an important extension. This is the castration fear. It is held that the boy very generally, if not invariably, develops a fear of mutilation, and this is essentially bound up in his hostility to the father.

¶ Freud says : "It is not at all uncommon for a little boy, who is beginning to play with his penis and has not yet learnt that he must conceal such activities, to be

threatened by parents or nurses that his member or his offending hand will be cut off. Parents will often admit the fact on being questioned . . . many people have a clear conscious recollection of this threat. . . . If the mother or some other woman makes the threat she usually shifts the execution of it to someone else, indicating that the father or the doctor will perform the deed. . . . It is, however, highly improbable that the threat of castration has been delivered as often as would appear from the analysis of a neurotic. We are content to understand that the child concocts a threat of this kind out of its knowledge that auto-erotic satisfactions are forbidden, on the basis of hints and allusions. . . . Whence comes the necessity for these phantasies, and the material for them? . . . I believe that these primal phantasies . . . are a phylogenetic possession. . . . It seems to me quite possible that . . . castration itself was in prehistoric periods of the human family a reality." Again he writes : "Of little girls we know that they feel themselves heavily handicapped . . . from this source primarily springs the wish to be a man which is

resumed again later in the neurosis." It is said that this complex may develop into hostility against man as such, forming therefore the psychological background of feministic movements, with all the ambitious desires to rival men on their own ground. Or else it may result in morbid self-depreciation. "For the great majority of womankind the 'deprivation' sense is resolved, at least tolerably, through the specially feminine functions, directly by child-bearing, more indirectly by child tending, by home-making or some kindred activity. In this way she becomes equal to the man and is vindicated." It is said that the girl usually attributes her deprivation to the mother (but some would deny that we have statistics enough to justify the employment of any quantitative term like "usually"). Thus the castration complex comes to be the centre of the hostility felt by the young child towards the parent of the same sex. It is to be noted that the term is the same for both sexes. Freud points out that the difference is merely that "between a castration that has been carried out and one that has been merely threatened."

Psychopathologists have very generally accepted the idea of a deprivation complex in the female. By this is meant the feeling that she has been anatomically deprived of male genitalia in exactly the same way as a person born with a finger missing would develop a sense of having been deprived by nature of anatomical completeness. In association with such a sense feelings of shame and resentment are liable to develop and these, calling for repression, constitute the complex. But Freud regards the castration complex in the female as based on the assumption that an act of mutilation has been performed upon her. He thus brings it into line with the castration complex of the boy who fears that such an act of mutilation will be performed on him.

It is important to note that in later years the unexplained steps in the formation and dissolution of the Œdipus complex have been attributed to phylogenetic influences. For the rest the dissolution of the Œdipus complex is by no means clearly formulated, in spite of the fact, already referred to, that it is of prime importance to the future development of the personality.

It was stated above that during adolescence the phases of infantile sexuality are recapitulated, more or less proportionately to their original importance or duration in the individual's childhood. Thus the oral phase may be represented by nail-biting, the anal-sadistic by noisy behaviour and a renewed interest in the excretory function, while the Œdipus situation reasserts itself, this time in consciousness. The issue of this re-activation of the complex is highly important for the future choice of a love-object. The normal resolution of the Œdipus leads to a homosexual direction of the libido. In the case of the boy this has two important implications: (a) The mother-attachment is less injured by the choice of a male love-object than it would be by the choice of a female. (b) The new<sup>m</sup> wave of narcissism that occurs after puberty favours the choice of a love-object as closely resembling oneself as possible. In the case of the girl the second factor is equally valid though the first does not hold.

✓ This narcissistic influence in the choice of the love-object persists very commonly after the homosexual phase has given way to the final heterosexual phase. It may

even have something to do with the popular approval of the marriage of opposites, i.e. that where the choice of love-objects is manifestly free from a narcissistic component the prospects of stability are good. The other factor in choice is called anaclitic—meaning dependent. This indicates the choice either of (1) the mother who tends, or (2) the father who protects. It is a matter of everyday observation that some men choose a mate who will ensure their comfort in life and others a woman who will protect them, whether by her size, status, wealth or ability. Similarly a girl may choose a very “maternal” husband who will see that she lacks nothing or a very powerful husband who will always give her a sense of security. On the other hand, many girls seek out a husband who corresponds to the demands of their own masculinity or their unresolved mating fear; such a husband will be an effeminate weakling unlikely to break down the defences of their own ill-developed femininity.

The flow of the libido may end in one of the following ways :

(a) Outward—to object-love.

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(b) Inward—to self-love (narcissism).

(c) Arrest—fixation on an object of immature choice.

(d) Backward—fixation on an object of earlier choice (regression).

(e) Dammed up—unexpressed (repression).

(f) Deflected—into channels of social value (sublimated).

It is obvious that only the first of these issues is unobstructed. Let us examine the others one by one.

*Narcissism*: This term is taken from the well-known myth of Narcissus. It was used by others before Freud took it over. The concept has assumed great importance in psycho-analytic theory. At first (as has been previously noted) Freud divided the instinctual urges into two groups: (a) libidinal, (b) ego-impulses; the latter being conceived as mainly defensive. Later he recognized that the libido can become attached to the Ego. Furthermore, he described necessary phases in development during which the Ego was normally the love-object.

Freud describes a secondary form of narcissism. When the libido is frustrated



in the quest of a love-object, the individual sets up the object as a phantasy within himself and proceeds to identify himself with that phantasy. The libido thus becomes turned inwards by being directed to the love-object in phantasy. To this mechanism he applies the term "introversion."

The important points to realize about narcissism are: (1) That it occurs as normal phases of development, and (2) That the crucial question is how far the individual succeeds in detaching his libido from his Ego. It follows that in every department of conduct the presence of a narcissistic component can be of great importance. We have already seen how it can affect the choice of the love-object. It is clearly a frequent if not constant element in parental love, and it has been claimed as the basis for all creative achievement, i.e. the production of works which reflect glory on the Ego.

The obstructions which may fix or re-activate narcissism are endless in their variety, in that the libido may always turn inward to the Ego as a reaction from any thwarting or deprivation in the pursuit of a love-object.

*Arrest of Libido:* When the libido is detached from the Ego it seeks a love-object to which it becomes attached. This attachment is called cathexis and the object is said to be "cathected." The love-objects normally constitute a progressive series beginning with the mother and ending with the mate. At any point in this series arrest may take place and the libido may remain attached to a love-object—e.g. the mother—instead of passing on to a love-object of more mature choice. When the love-object on which fixation occurs is the parent of the opposite sex we have the Œdipus situation. Originally this was used to describe the incestuous desire of the boy towards his mother with the necessary rivalry towards his father. The same desire of the girl towards her father was called the Electra situation. Later, however, the first of these terms was applied to either sex, and the Electra designation was dropped. This complex will be studied at greater length later on. It is merely given here as the most obvious example of arrest.

*Regression:* This is the term applied to the attachment of the libido to a love-

object belonging to an earlier stage in development. For instance, a youth may fall in love with a girl in a normal way, but when he is rebuffed by her he may fall back on a mother-attachment and there his libido may remain fixed. This phenomenon, in partial or complete form, is so common that little need be said about it here. In general it may be regarded as more serious from the point of view of psychopathology than is simple arrest.

*Repression* : When the libido is dammed up and no external love-object chosen, it is assumed that the libido is either attached to the Ego or repressed. If the latter, it may either be repressed into the unconscious Ego or into the Id. During the earlier phases of psycho-analysis repression played a great part as the primary mechanism whereby the individual protected himself from the intrusion of painful ideas and impulses. The true aim of repression is to suppress the development of affects, emotions and feelings. The essence of the process is said to lie in preventing the ideational representation of an instinct from becoming conscious.

*Sublimation* : By this term is meant the

expression of the libido in some cognate activity which is socially approved. Freud writes : " We believe that civilization has been built up, under the pressure of the struggle for existence, by sacrifices in gratification of the primitive impulses, and that it is to a great extent for ever being re-created, as each individual successively joining the community repeats the sacrifice of his instinctive pleasures for the common good." The sexual are amongst the most important of the instinctive forces thus utilized : they are in this way sublimated, that is to say, their energy is turned aside from its sexual goal and diverted towards other ends, no longer sexual and socially more valuable. But the structure thus built up is insecure, for the sexual impulses are with difficulty controlled ; in each individual who takes up his part in the work of civilization there is a danger that a rebellion of the sexual impulses may occur, against this diversion of their energy. It is claimed that the process must necessarily be unconscious. It must be remarked, however, that the conscious process of devoting love energy to a non-sexual end appears to fulfil the same

function as far as society is concerned. But from the point of view of the individual effective sublimation must be "the same thing in another form." In any case it is obvious that sublimation is in the psycho-analytic scheme of things, the main opportunity of socializing the individual. As, however, a great deal of sublimation is condemned as being the outcome of super-ego compulsion, the opportunity is not so valuable as might at first sight appear. Jones says: "It cannot be insisted on too strongly that sublimation is concerned not so much with normal sexual desire in the narrow sense, as with individual biological components of the instinct, i.e. with the various infantile tendencies that later on form the basis of erotic desire, as well as of many other non-sexual interests. This . . . means that sublimation is not a matter of displacing for other purposes a diffuse energy. . . ."

We may sum up the fate of the libido as follows:

- (1) Outward to a love-object which may be mature, immature, or of earlier choice.
- (2) Inward on to the Ego.
- (3) Downward into the Unconscious.

(4) Outward and desexualized, i.e. sublimated.

(4) *Life and Death Instincts*. In a previous section an attempt was made to outline Freud's views on the Libido and the Ego. At first he divided the instinctive forces into two. Later, as we have seen, he formulated the conception of Ego-libido, the attachment of a portion of the libido to the Ego. This left the non-libidinal Ego trends somewhat obscure in nature and function. Later still he introduced a totally different conception—that of the life and death instincts. The difficulty of reconciling the two categories of instinctive activity is considerable, but it would be unfair to leave the dynamic aspect of psycho-analysis as it was several years ago, and therefore an effort must be made to summarize these later views, which first appeared in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* in 1922. In this work Freud defined an instinct as “a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition.” It will be at once apparent to the reader that this definition implies a theory and that it differs completely from

the definitions of instinct which are current in biology and psychology. Mitchell says that Freud "is concerned with more elemental tendencies of living creatures than those to which the term instinct is usually applied. He makes little or no reference to the efforts of other psychologists to describe and classify what they believe to be the irreducible innate tendencies underlying human and animal behaviour."

Rickman in referring to this theory says that "Freud gave rein to his speculative inclinations" and indeed Freud himself admits that he does not know how far he is convinced by his own theory. This theory originally emanated from the study of war cases. Cases of traumatic neurosis (popularly described as "shell-shock") were found under psycho-analysis to be due to a desire for erotic gratification, the symptoms being subjected to great distortion. But there also appeared a compulsion to repeat the original situation of trauma either in dream, symptom or phantasy. A similar tendency was noted by Freud in the relation of the neurotic to his analyst—i.e. "transference" situations

recurred which were repetitions of painful earlier situations. Furthermore, Freud believed he recognized the same repetition compulsion in the play of children. He therefore inferred that the most irreducible force in life is a manifestation of inertia and that its ultimate objective is a return to the inorganic state. How then is there any drive towards procreation? This difficulty Freud met by the speculation that the different cells of the body all possessed this "instinctive" tendency, and that when the differentiation took place between generative and somatic cells, the former manifested the repetition urge by striving to create an earlier condition of the life cycle while the latter directed their energy towards death—i.e. the return to the inorganic. The generative cells would therefore contribute the component elements of the libido while the latter constitute the "death-instincts" as he named them. "The one group of instincts presses forward to reach the final goal of life as quickly as possible, the other flies back at a certain point on the way, only to traverse the same stretch once more from a given spot and thus to prolong the duration of



the journey. Although sexuality and the distinction of the sexes certainly did not exist at the dawn of life, nevertheless it remains possible that the instincts which are later described as sexual were active from the very beginning and took up the part of opposition to the rôle of the 'ego-instincts' then and not only at some later time." This division into a sexual and non-sexual function allows the sexual cells to concentrate their energies on libidinal activity, while "the non-sexual cells utilize their sexual energies in 'neutralizing' their own and each other's death-instincts." The self-preservative ego-instincts are accounted for as "part-instincts designed to secure the path to death peculiar to the organism . . . even these watchmen of life were originally the myrmidons of death." Thus, as Mitchell observes, "the course of life is but a circuitous path to death, forced upon the organism in the beginning by external forces and conserved for repetition by the instincts."

To the life instincts Freud gave the name of Eros. The substitution of the Greek for the Latin word, indicated a radical change in his conception of the

libido, but a still more radical change has to be inferred in his whole conception of ego-instincts. Rickman states (1927) that these views are not cardinal and that "psycho-analytic psychiatry can get on very well without them at present." This may or may not be the case, but it would be idle to ignore the fact that in promulgating his theory of Eros-death-instincts Freud has challenged the whole biological conception of the evolutionary process. Freud has made many demands on students of his theory, including renunciation of the "illusion of free will," but in nothing has he challenged contemporary science so definitely as in repudiating in the way he does here what many would call the *fundamental tenets of accepted evolutionary theory*.

(5) *Mental Mechanisms*. Many different mechanisms are recognized in psycho-analysis. One authority actually lists seventeen. It is beyond the scope of this work to consider more than a few.

Repression, we have already seen, is the force constantly at work in the psyche. It is perhaps the most central concept in all Freud's work. Of it he says: "It is

possible to take repression as a centre and to bring all the elements of psycho-analytic theory into relation with it." There are two aspects of repression. The first and more important is to exclude from consciousness material that never was conscious. The second is to expel from consciousness or from the preconscious material which is disapproved. This may be driven either into the Id or into the Unconscious Ego. It is to be borne in mind that ideas belong essentially to the conscious and preconscious. When repression is exerted against material that has never been conscious, it is conceived as preventing the impulse from becoming attached to an idea, without which it could not enter consciousness. "The essence of the process of repression lies in preventing the ideational presentation of an instinct from becoming conscious." This aspect of repression is sometimes called primal, as opposed to "after expulsion." In psycho-analytic treatment it is the latter form of repression which is mostly or, at any rate, primarily dealt with.

If we bear in mind the three forces with which the Ego has to contend—Reality,

the Super-Ego and the Id—and think of repression as the chief way in which it has to react to these contending forces, it is easy to see that repression must be incessantly operative and conflict unintermittent. To maintain peace within itself the Ego has to exclude or expel ideas that are incompatible with reality or disapproved by the Super-Ego. But the Id appears to display much ingenuity in countering repression. One of its methods is *displacement*, whereby the impulse that would be presented in consciousness by one idea is transferred to another idea, which is more acceptable. Furthermore, a number of ideas can be fused in ways calculated to elude or overcome the repressing force.

*Although the chief function of repression is directed against the Id, repression can also occur against the Super-Ego. In this case the unwelcome idea is driven back into the unconscious part of the Ego.*

Finally, repression can be exerted against reality, as occurs when we “forget” facts and circumstances which should have had an inhibiting effect on our behaviour. In this case the repressed idea only goes into the preconscious. When an experience

has been sufficiently painful we repress it; according to the intensity of the pain it has occasioned, it may reach the preconscious or the unconscious. In the latter case it can only be recovered by specialized technique. Intensely painful experiences may have such extensive ideational associations that complete repression involves dissociation, when considerable portions of the ego-content are split off. This occurs in certain manifestations of hysteria, in insanity, and in dual personality.

It is important to realize that repression can be directed not only against instinctual, infantile or primitive impulses, but also against lofty impulses. Freud says: "Not only the lowest but the highest in the Ego may be unconscious." At the same time it must be remembered that once repressed the impulse ceases to have any moral significance or status. In the unconscious "social, moral, ethical, altruistic and æsthetic considerations are simply ignored, as completely as though they did not exist."

*Reaction formation* is a mechanism whereby the object of repression is partially served by the development of an

antithetic attitude in consciousness to the disapproved attitude. Thus excessive devotion—e.g. to a parent—may be a negation of hate. The unconscious obtains surrogate satisfaction while the Ego ostensibly satisfies Super-Ego demands.

Another common mechanism is that of *Projection*. “A man with dishonest tendencies becomes tremendously concerned with keeping a close watch on others to see that they do not rob his employer.” In this way the conflict between Super-Ego demands and repressed impulses is externalized instead of taking place in the Ego.

*Identification* occurs when an individual imitates another and takes him for a pattern. The most familiar example is the little boy identifying himself with his father. Owing to this factor identification is an almost invariable mechanism in the Œdipus situation. Identification frequently manifests itself in hysteria when symptoms appear similar to those associated with the object of identification. It is important to remember that Freud attributes to this mechanism the phenomena of herd behaviour. Thereby he gives to these

phenomena in the human species an explanation which is inapplicable in the sub-human species. Most psychologists assume that herd reactions in man are explicable in the same way as similar reactions in animals. Some would attribute these reactions to instinct, that is, a ready-made inborn capacity of effective behaviour. Others would regard them as conditioned reflexes. In either case the explanation involves a lower plane of origin than that assumed by Freud.

*Rationalization* is a very frequent mechanism whereby the Ego refuses to admit that it is illogical. Very few people admit that their prejudices and preferences are incompatible with reason. Hence they make a fictitious argument to prove that their conduct is not absurd but entirely logical.

*Introversion.* Freud's use of this term demands a note of explanation, if for no other reason than that the word is a key-word with Jung who gives it a different, and wider, connotation. Freud's synonym for introversion is phantasy-cathexis. By this he means that the libido instead of seeking an external love-object is turned

inwards, but not on to the self as in narcissism. In this case it is turned on to phantasies of objects, activities and situations from which gratification is experienced. It serves as a retreat from painful reality, and in some measure is normal in psychic development.

*Polarities.* In psycho-analytic theory considerable importance is attached to the conception of paired opposites. Perhaps the love-hate situation is the best example. Others are pleasure-pain, subject-object, life-death, male-female. This is also stressed by Jung.

*Ambivalence.* This term is used for the emotional attitude that fluctuates from positive to negative in relation to the same object. The child's love for his mother is nearly always ambivalent, oscillating between love and hate. Another example is that of the adult who is capable of erotic behaviour towards either sex indiscriminately.

Finally, it must not be forgotten that the dream, the neurosis and the psychosis are all forms of psychic activity that centre round the fundamental mechanism of repression.



(6) *Dreams.* Whatever else he did or did not do, Freud would have achieved greatness simply by being the first to convince an extremely sceptical world that there may be meaning in dreams. During the thirty-two years that have elapsed since his first publication on the subject a prodigious amount of work has been done by Freud and his school, and the Freudian concept of the dream is now extremely complex.

"Dreams," says Freud, "are the mode of reaction of the mind to stimuli acting upon it during sleep." And elsewhere: "A dream is itself a neurotic symptom and, moreover, one which possesses for us the incalculable advantage of occurring in all healthy people."

Freud's original view of the dream had three basic principles: first, that the function of the dream was to protect sleep; second, that there was invariably a latent content which was not the same as the manifest content; and third, that every dream represented the gratification of an unfulfilled wish, generally infantile in character. He maintained that, far from being a farrago of nonsense accidentally deter-

mined by physical causes, the dream represented repressed cravings and strivings, and that its interpretation could yield valuable information concerning the unconscious life of the patient. He attributed the form of the dream as remembered or recorded—i.e. the manifest content—to a process of disguise which served an important function. The latent content—or actual meaning of the dream—was, he presumed, of such a nature as would disturb sleep, whereas in its disguised form it was able to pass the censor and appear in dream-consciousness as an innocent presentation, and thereby the dreamer's sleep continued undisturbed. When the dream took on the nature of a nightmare and so awoke the dreamer, it was supposed that the dream had failed in its function. In other words, the latent content had not been successfully disguised, and the danger to the Ego had thus become apparent. As the waking censor is presumably more effective than the dream censor, the Ego once awake can resist unwelcome ideas better than in sleep. Hence the nightmare consists of an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the libido to evade repression.

In every dream the repressed wish has to be disguised by suitable imagery. This process Freud calls the dream-work. In addition to countless subsidiary mechanisms described in the literature, Freud recognizes four chief means of distortion.

The first is *dramatization* whereby the idea in the latent content is turned into action; abstract ideas are turned into concrete images. This is perhaps the most characteristic aspect of the dream-work.

The second is *condensation*. "By this term," writes Freud, "we mean to convey the fact that the content of the manifest dream is less rich than that of the latent thoughts, it is, as it were, a kind of abbreviated translation of the latter . . . condensation is accomplished in the following ways: (1) certain latent elements are altogether omitted; (2) of many complexes in the latent dream only a fragment passes over into the manifest content; (3) latent elements sharing common characteristics are in the manifest dream put together, blended into a single whole." The familiar aspect of condensation is the composite dream figure—the person who looks like A but is dressed like B, for

instance. This composite symbol conveys with special emphasis the characteristic common to both A and B.

The third mechanism of the dream-work is called *displacement*. "A latent element may be replaced, not by a part of itself, but by something more remote, something of the nature of an allusion ; and secondly, the accent may be transferred from an important element to another which is unimportant, so that the centre of the dream is shifted, as it were, giving the dream a foreign appearance." Freud points out that the essence of these three processes is essentially regressive, as it implies a translation of the wish into an archaic form of language instead of expressing it in the abstract terms of modern language.

The fourth mechanism is called *secondary elaboration*. This takes place at the moment of entering consciousness and is continued. As a result the dream is more coherent and sensible ; it undergoes, as it were, a process of rationalizing. In consequence of this mechanism a dream recorded immediately on waking tends to be much more absurd than if it is recalled

and written down later. The process presumably occurs in the preconscious, and it is of the nature of a concession to the logical character of the Ego.

In order to interpret the dream the method of free association is used whereby the significance to the dreamer of every detail of the recorded dream is made clear, the aim being to reduce the manifest content once more to latent content. Thus the repressed wish that constitutes the nucleus of the dream is laid bare. It must be clearly understood that the function of the dream is not only to represent in dream consciousness the disturbing wish, but rather to represent an imagined fulfilment of that wish in the disguised form we have been discussing. Or in other words, "Internal stimuli, caused by the pressure of instincts, are given free play by the sleeper and allowed to find satisfaction." The dream is therefore like a neurotic symptom in that it is a compromise formation. By it a repressed impulse can achieve a certain satisfaction while the demands of the Ego are ostensibly observed. In other words, the moral standards of the Ego are surreptitiously contravened. "We sleep, and

yet we experience the satisfaction of a wish ; we gratify a wish and at the same time continue to sleep."

In weaving the manifest content frequent use is made of recent events, as everyone is aware. The "unassimilated residuum of recent experience" is always the material most easily available for furnishing the disguise of the dream. Hence it follows that many people believe that their dreams are always "about the happenings of the previous day." That indicates the success of the "dream-work" or disguise process. Freud claims that any dream that is adequately recorded will, by free association, reveal a wish, probably infantile in character, that will surprise or shock the dreamer. Many psychologists outside the Freudian school accept much of Freud's theory of dreams, but contend that a dream *may* sometimes, if not frequently, be a mere reflection of recent occurrences. The nature of the wish that is the centre of the dream is generally an infantile sexual wish. It is understandable that this should be so since the repressing forces of the Ego are directed towards these impulses more than against

any others. In this connection Freud says: "It is easy to see that hunger, thirst or the need to excrete, can produce dreams of satisfaction just as well as any repressed sexual or egoistic impulse."

For instance, "there is the 'comfort'-dream, rightly so called, in which someone who wants to go on sleeping dreams that he has already got up. . . . In these dreams the desire for sleep . . . expresses itself plainly and appears as their actual originator."

Some of the original stock symbols are as follows :

The only typical representation of the human form as a whole is that of a *house*.

Parents appear in dreams as *Emperor and Empress, King and Queen* or other exalted personages.

Birth is almost invariably represented by some reference to *water*. For dying we have setting out upon a *journey* or *travelling* by train.

*Clothes* and *uniform* stand for nakedness.

The sacred number *three* is symbolic of the whole male genitalia.

The penis is symbolized by objects such as *sticks, umbrellas, poles, trees* and the like.

Also by objects which penetrate or injure : *knives, daggers, lances*, etc., fire-arms are similarly used : *guns, pistols* and *revolvers*. This is perhaps the most frequently occurring dream-symbol.

Symbols of the penis which refer to erection are *balloons, aeroplanes* and *Zep-pelins*.

This also is the significance of dreams in which the *dreamer himself flies*.

Male sexual symbols "less easy to understand" include *fishes* and "above all the famous symbol of the *serpent*."

The female genitalia are symbolically represented by all such objects as share with them the property of enclosing a space or of acting as receptacles : such as *pits, caves, jars, bottles, chests, pockets* and so forth. Yet another noteworthy symbol of the female genital organ is a *jewel-case*.

"These symbolic relations are not peculiar to the dreamer or to the dream-work by which they are expressed."

Of recent years the tendency has been to regard every symbol, however conventional, as subject to the dreamer's personal associations and interpretations. In this



matter Jung has always protested against stock interpretations, and it would seem that the psycho-analytic school is approximating to his standpoint.

Another change in theory is more fundamental. It has to do with one of Freud's basic concepts, namely that every dream represents wish-fulfilment. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* he uses the phrase: "We concede for the first time an exception to the principle that the dream is a wish-fulfilment." This had to do with repetition compulsions and other material out of which he built his Eros-death-instinct theory.

In dealing with cases of war neurosis Freud recognized dreams that could not be interpreted as mere wish-fulfilment. In these battle dreams the traumatic experience seemed to be re-enacted again and again. It seemed necessary for the patient to do this in order to "master the great amount of psychical excitation which it evoked by a mental means." He then went on to conceive this traumatic experience as being associated with a libidinal wish. This then would be the first stage of the dream mechanism. The second

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stage would be the original process which has already been described, namely "the translation of the imagined wish-fulfilment into imagery suitable for acceptance by consciousness." It is clear that this extension of Freud's original formula has enormously widened the field of investigation and has added still further complexity to a study which for practical purposes was already complex enough—and perhaps more than enough.

We may conclude this chapter by giving an example of Freud's dream interpretation. This is taken from Professor Flügel's *Introduction of Psycho-Analysis*, pages 76–81.

"A female patient undergoing psycho-analytic treatment dreamt that: 'The tuner had come to tune the piano. He was engaged in taking out a number of seeds from the inside of the piano.' Short as it was, the analysis of this dream occupied a whole hour's session, and revealed very clearly the following symbolizations and over-determinations. The dreamer herself is represented by the piano, a choice of symbol that is partly determined by the circumstance that she was

a proficient amateur musician (though her own instrument was the violin) and partly by the fact that she was suffering from serious worry and overwork at the time of the dream, and that she had herself, the day before, expressed her longing 'to go *piano* for a bit,' i.e. to take life more easily. This desire 'to go *piano*' (represented symbolically by actually being a piano) is the first and most superficial wish-fulfilment of a dream. The tuner is a symbol of the analyst—one indeed that is apt enough, for there is an obvious analogy between the relation of a tuner to a piano and that of an analyst to his patient. The dream therefore contains a reference (as so many dreams do) to the analytic situation itself. But why is the tuner (analyst) removing seeds from the piano (patient)? With this question we come to the sexual elements which are so seldom lacking in dreams, for seed, here as elsewhere, refers to the biological processes of reproduction. But the associations made it evident that there were three distinct meanings within this general sphere. In the first place, seeds refer to certain sexual desires, which, as the analysis was making her realize, she

had all-unknowingly harboured in her mind. The analysis, she hoped, would rid her of these, as it seemed to her, evil and unseemly desires. Hence the analyst was symbolically removing them. This is the second wish-fulfilment. It will be observed that it is one that fits in pretty well with the interpretations that have been stressed by Jung and his school, for the 'seeds' may with some justice be regarded as a symbol of the libido itself (though, it is true, in a narrower and more definitely erotic sense). But there are two further wish-fulfilments of a cruder and more instinctive kind. The word 'seed' can be metaphorically used for 'offspring,' and the third meaning of the dream is that the analyst is acting as the patient's accoucheur at the birth of a child. Lest the reader be astonished and disgusted, let him remember that Socrates, who with his motto 'Know thyself' appears to have been in some ways very definitely a forerunner of Freud, likened his own spiritual labours to those of a midwife, who helped women to the birth of children in much the same way as he himself helped men to the birth of self-understanding. Fourthly, and

finally, the dream represents the opposite of taking out, i.e. putting in; in other words, the analyst is thought of as putting his seed into the patient. Here the reader who is untrained in psycho-analysis is likely to remain incredulous. But before he definitely rejects this interpretation as both unpleasant and absurd, we would mention three sources from which evidence from analogy is forthcoming to support it. In the first place the condensation of the ideas of coitus and birth is one that is found to be of very frequent occurrence in psycho-analysis. It is as if the unconscious tended to identify the two processes as marking the two most interesting points, the beginning and the end, of the cycle of gestation, bridging over, as it were, the nine months that intervene. Secondly, as regards representation by opposites (in this case the symbolization of 'putting in' by 'taking out'), we must remember that this process is by no means confined to dreams (where it is frequently found), but is familiar to us through that conscious expression of humour and hostility that we term irony. Thirdly, as regards the rôle of the tuner (analyst), this is the place for

referring to what is found to be a constant feature in psycho-analysis, namely that the person of the analyst becomes invested with a very high degree of feeling, both of love and of hate—emotions that are derived from the psychological relationships in which the patient has stood to persons of importance in his earlier environment (parents, nurses, teachers, etc., but especially the first named), and which in the course of the analysis are temporarily transferred to the analyst himself; whence the technical name for this process, which is called Transference.

“To sum up the features of this dream which here especially concern us.—The dream reveals itself as highly over-determined, inasmuch as it gives expression to four distinguishable wishes: (1) to get rid of worry and overwork (*‘go piano’*), (2) to get rid of disturbing sexual desires, (3) to give birth to a child with the help of the analyst, (4) to have sexual intercourse with the analyst (i.e. to receive a child from him). It may be noted that the second wish is incompatible with, and may even be regarded as the opposite of, the third and fourth.”

(7) *Psychopathology*. As is well known, the bulk of all psycho-analytic investigation has to deal with the neuroses. On this account there has been much criticism. It has frequently been said that the findings in neurotic cases have unjustifiably been applied to normal psychology. In point of fact this is not a valid objection, for it is certainly true that neurotic symptoms are only a quantitative divergence from the idiosyncrasies of the normal man. Functional nervous disorder is in some way or another always a failure to grow up in relation to the exactions of one's environment. In the study of such failure much is to be learned about the "normal" man who has succeeded where his weaker neighbour has failed.

Hart, in a recent address, said: "It is only necessary here that we should emphasize once more the momentous nature of the advance which Freud attempted, and its paramount significance in the history of psychological medicine. He refused to accept the traditional limitation of psychology to the merely descriptive levels of science, and insisted that psychology could furnish causal conceptions capable

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of explaining many of the phenomena of medicine, particularly phenomena which had proved peculiarly resistant to every other line of attack. Finally, he produced a body of theory and practice which, however faulty it may ultimately prove to be and however it may be battered in the slow future growth of knowledge, will remain the first consistent attempt to apply to medicine a conceptual psychology built along the lines which have proved so fertile in other branches of science, and which has at least cast more light upon the problems of neurotic disorder than any other method of approach has yet achieved."

Alexander gives a single formula to cover the neuroses ; it is "the principle that the neurotic psyche knows no satisfaction without suffering."

This is a valuable key, and it will be useful to see how far it helps us in the understanding of a complicated subject.

The first step towards neurosis is privation which leads to accumulation of libido. Given a normal or supranormal capacity for sublimation, this crisis might be controlled. But the neurotic lacks a normal



capacity for sublimation. This accumulated libido then re-activates phantasies in the unconscious which hitherto have been more or less dormant. These phantasies then demand admission to the conscious and at once encounter the resistance of the Ego. At this point the issue depends on the dimensions of the Super-Ego. If it has attained normal importance and power over the Ego, complete repression will follow. The consequence is that the libido reappears as a—or the—neurotic symptom which serves the dual purpose of ensuring libidinal satisfaction and of ranking in the eyes of the Super-Ego as punishment or privation. Freud says: “[The symptoms] are in fact, as we shall see, the effects of compromises between two opposed tendencies, acting on one another; they represent both that which is repressed and also that which has effected the repression and has co-operated in bringing them about. . . . In hysteria a collaboration of the two tendencies in one symptom is usually achieved. In the obsessional neurosis the two parts are often distinct: the symptom is then a double one and consists of two successive actions which cancel each

other." It is claimed that the determination of hysteria or obsessional neurosis lies in the history of the individual's infantile sexuality. If he—or more probably, she—has reached the genital stage of infantile sexuality, then the re-activated phantasies will be Œdipus phantasies. They will present themselves to her conscious as fully organized incestuous wishes. As such they will meet with intense repression. In consequence a symptom is evolved—e.g. a monoplegia or an anæsthesia—which ensures substitutive satisfaction and at the same time ranks as privation or suffering, and is therefore equivalent to self-punishment.

If, on the other hand, the individual's libido had been arrested at the anal-sadistic stage the unconscious impulse would be to destroy the love-object. This thought emerging into consciousness would produce tormenting distress, and thereby satisfy the Super-Ego by the suffering it occasioned. In obsessional neurosis it is the regression rather than repression that is the important factor.

In general, the factors determining whether neurosis or normality results are the following :

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(1) Whether an adequate amount of libido is available for coping with reality.

(2) Whether the situation in reality is easy or exacting.

(3) Whether the libidinal impulses can be so disguised as to pass into the conscious as sublimation.

(4) The tyrannical or lenient disposition of the Super-Ego.

In connection with the neuroses, the factor of anxiety is very prominent. In earlier years Freud held that repressed libido achieved discharge as anxiety. Now he regards it as a defensive reaction of the Ego to danger situations. Thus anxiety may be experienced when the Ego fears the re-activation by association of libidinal phantasies to meet which repression would be called for. Freud now describes three typical classes of anxiety situation. These are: (1) Anxiety about the loss of love, (2) Castration anxiety, (3) Super-Ego or social anxiety. These might roughly be equated in non-Freudian terms with: (1) Dependence on parents and consequent over-valuation of parental approval, (2) Fear of parents and therefore of punishment, (3) Fear of the herd and consequent

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anxiety about social adjustment or 'subsistence'. The last of these three sources of anxiety is regarded as permanent and in a moderate degree normal. The first two are conditioned by imperfect development of the libido, whereas the third emanates from ego-impulses. "The neurotic is differentiated from the normal by the fact that he immoderately heightens the reaction to these dangers." Furthermore, he does so primarily because of his inherent limitation of sublimating capacity. In so far as the libido of the neurotic is bound up in infantile unconscious desires, to that extent he has less libido available for dealing with reality. This repressed libido is available to re-activate the unconscious phantasies and this danger is signalled by anxiety in the Ego.

Discussing the factor of environment in the development of the neuroses Ferenczi writes : "Freud compares the inheritance of the neuroses with that of tuberculosis. Just as in inherited tuberculosis a thorough examination often shows that one has to deal with an infection acquired in childhood from a diseased environment and not merely with the congenital organic weak-

ness; in the same way, in the case of children of neurotic parents, we must, along with heredity, attribute great importance also to the abnormal mental impressions to which they have been exposed since early childhood."

Rickman divides mental and functional disorder into five groups :

(1) The Transference neuroses : Obsessional neurosis, Conversion hysteria and Anxiety hysteria. The essential feature of all these is conflict between the Ego and the Id.

(2) The Narcissistic neuroses : Manic depressive "disease" and the "Patho-neuroses." In these the essential feature is conflict between the Ego and the Super-Ego.

(3) The Psychoses : Paranoia, and Dementia præcox. In these the essential conflict is between the Ego and reality.

(4) The Actual neuroses : Anxiety neurosis, neurasthenia, hypochondria.

(5) Traumatic neurosis which constitutes a class by itself.

It is to be noted that the first three of these groups correspond to the three forces to which the Ego is exposed, namely the

Id, the Super-Ego and reality. It is also to be remarked that the classification cannot be correlated with any other current classification. For instance, Manic depression and Dementia præcox, which constituted Kraepelin's two main groups of psychosis, are to be found one among the narcissistic neuroses and the other among the psychoses. While it is perfectly obvious that a mental disorder may be identified before it has assumed features which are usually called psychotic, it is equally obvious that we are no further forward if we describe one psychosis as a neurosis and another as a true psychosis. This is but another example of the great difficulty of bringing psycho-analytic theory into line with allied branches of study.

In conclusion, the following points about the neuroses should be remembered :

(1) Every neurotic symptom has a meaning.

(2) The symptom is a compromise formation exactly like the dream.

(3) It must serve the dual function of (a) substitutive gratification, and (b) suffering.

(8) *Treatment.* The original method used

by Freud for the treatment of the neuroses was known as the abreaction or cathartic method. The patient was hypnotized and suggestions made whereby he was induced to re-experience the central painful experience which was supposed to be the cause of the neurosis. In achieving this abreaction the original experience was not merely recalled but re-enacted with all its acute emotional element. Though Freud abandoned this method after a short time, it has nevertheless proved of considerable value in the hands of non-Freudian analysts such as Hadfield and W. Brown, and particularly so in cases of war neuroses. Freud's reason for giving it up was that he found a number of cases were unhypnotizable. It was from a study of this phenomenon, which he called resistance, that he passed on to develop his theory of repression. Another discovery he made in the early years was that a remarkable number of his cases produced dramatic experiences of seduction in childhood, and similar sexual traumata. He slowly came to the conclusion that these were not always factual but very frequently phantasies. He realized that the important

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question to be answered was why so many neurotic patients should have phantasies relating to early sexuality. This gave him a clue for his Œdipus theory.

Meantime he substituted for hypnotism what he called "free association." The actual technique is as follows: the room is usually darkened, the analyst sits out of sight of the patient, who lies on a couch. The patient is instructed to close his eyes, to make no effort to direct his thoughts, and to express freely whatever comes into his mind. Some patients have considerable difficulty in acquiring this art; to others it comes readily. The analyst is for the most part silent, occasionally encouraging, but never didactic nor critical. If he has interpretations to offer, he must exercise great caution in choosing the moments at which to interpose.

Freud very soon discovered the analytic value of the dream and for many years the dream was regarded as "the royal road to the unconscious." But as he developed his libido and Œdipus theories further, he came to lay increasing stress on what he called "the transference." By this is denoted the relation of the analysand to the



analyst. It corresponds in some measure to the "rapport" of the older suggestion schools. But it is something very much more complex. It is supposed that the analysand enters into a relationship with the analyst which permits him to work through the various stages of his Œdipus complex in a form of recapitulation. This aspect of psycho-analytic method has aroused, as may easily be understood, a considerable amount of criticism. It is held that the analysis of the transference is more fruitful and important than the analysis of dreams; not that the one excludes the other in any way.

The transference is said to go through three phases.

(a) The opening phase. This is generally easy and pleasant. The patient finds himself in an uncritical atmosphere and soon the old child-parent situation begins to develop and the absence of reproof on the part of the analyst creates a great sense of freedom. "The analysis too makes splendid progress under these conditions, the patient understands the suggestions offered to him, concentrates upon the tasks appointed by the treatment, the material

needed—his recollections and associations—is abundantly available; he astonishes the analyst by the sureness and accuracy of his interpretations, and the latter has only to observe with satisfaction how readily and willingly a sick man will accept all the new psychological ideas that are so hotly contested in the world outside. A general improvement in the patient's condition, objectively confirmed on all sides, also accompanies this harmonious relationship in the analysis. But such fair weather cannot last for ever." It is not always, however, that the opening phase of the transference is as peaceful as Freud indicates in the passage quoted. Sometimes a negative transference of more or less intensity makes itself obvious at once. In other cases there may be an alternation between positive and negative manifestations as one resistance is overcome and another encountered.

(b) The second stage is called the "transference neurosis." (It is to be noted that this term is also used as a synonym for psycho-neurosis to designate a group of the neuroses which includes hysteria, obsessional neurosis and anxiety neurosis. It is

perhaps unfortunate that the same term should be applied to "this new artificial neurosis.") The main feature of this phase consists in "a complete re-enacting of the infantile Œdipus experience." It must be clearly understood that in this re-enactment the analyst can play whatever rôle the analysand's unconscious requires. He may now be the girl's adoring and adored father, and now the strict mother of the middle-aged man. According to the skill of the analyst, these unconscious libidinal strivings of infantile sexuality will repeat themselves, and thereby the hitherto unconscious becomes conscious.

(c) The third stage is the dissolution of the transference. Technically this consists in making the repetition into a recollection. In other words, the various affective reactions to the analyst occurring in the transference neurosis must be linked up to the actual parent relationship in childhood, and the patient must realize that none of them originated in the present situation. The analyst has to prove to the patient that he was a lay figure all the time.

It is obvious that any form of therapy which necessitates recourse to such a subtle

and even equivocal situation is not without its dangers. That, however, is no reason for condemning it any more than it would be a justification for denouncing a delicate intra-cranial operation. The fact of the matter is that psycho-analysis is not a practical form of therapy for functional nervous disorders. At present the usual duration of an analysis is said to be from two to three years of daily sittings. It must therefore be economically unavailable to the vast mass of those who require it.

Gillespie has estimated that there must always be some 3,000,000 neurotic sufferers in the British Isles in need of active treatment. The army of psycho-analysts required for such a number becomes quite fantastic. It might be as feasible to contemplate sending every tubercular patient to winter in the Canary Islands. So long therefore as the psycho-analytic technique remains as it is now, it must be available only to the very small minority who have adequate time and money to embark on so protracted a treatment. But it is probable that necessity, which is the mother of invention, will bring about a substantial curtailment of the treatment. Some ten

years ago or more Ferenczi was already calling for an abbreviated technique, throwing out the hint that even a return to suggestion might be considered. Since then he has developed his "active" therapy" which appears to reduce the duration to some extent. It is not, however, regarded with approval in all Freudian circles. Rank has devised a very heterodox technique which begins with a time-limit. In this way he claims to complete an analysis in four to six months. It is probable, however, that psycho-analytic theory itself will have to undergo substantial modification before a technique is devised which will be rapid enough to fulfil practical requirements.

## CHAPTER II

### SOME CRITICISMS OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS

FROM the nature of the case it is difficult to discuss the Freudian system from without. The fact that no one is inside the system who has not had an adequate and successful analysis, coupled with the fact that the analysis is not considered to be adequate or successful unless the analysand's final resistances have been overcome, implies that criticism from within is a contradiction in terms. Either the critic is not entitled to criticize because he has not had the vital experience, or else he has ex-hypothesi been cured of his desire or ability to criticize. Hence it resembles the attempt to evaluate Freemasonry. Either you are outside and therefore not in a position to hold an opinion or else you are inside, which implies that you have pledged yourself to speak no evil of the system. It is therefore obvious that

psycho-analysis comes under a special category in relation to every other branch of science. When one contemplates the prodigious literature that has accumulated in about thirty years, one might be pardoned for concluding that it constituted the material for criticism as in other departments of knowledge. But this is not the case; or rather, the material for criticism is there, but the perusal of it does not give the right to criticize. This situation is accentuated by the way in which men always react to initiation. Stevenson says: "It is a great thing if you can make a man believe that he is a partaker in a mystery." The result is always a loyalty which reveals itself in a resentment of criticism. Hence we have the phenomenon of a great mass of modern literature which, it is claimed, is scientific. It is open to the whole scientific world to discuss. But any criticism that is remotely unfavourable is at once met by the protest—sometimes rather shrill—that the critic has no *locus standi* as he has not himself been initiated.

It is obvious, however, that Freud's system cannot indefinitely claim to belong

to science and yet be exempt from external criticism. Perhaps no one has stated the case more clearly nor more justly than Bernard Hart in his third Goulstonian Lecture (1926). No apology need be made for summarizing this lecture and quoting certain vital passages at length.

Hart begins by pointing out the important change in Freud's theory whereby the libido was supposed to attach itself to the Ego, thereby modifying the original concept of conflict between the libidinal and ego impulses. This change was partly the outcome of studying the phenomena of dementia præcox, but more directly the result of investigating the psycho-neuroses of war. "The general effect of these observations was to confirm in a high degree Freud's conception of mechanism, while they threw grave doubt upon his generalization that psycho-neuroses invariably involved the sex instincts and were the result of fixations and regressions in the action of the libido. The Freudian school, however, endeavoured to save the position by an application of their new conception of narcissism. The part apparently played in the war psycho-neuroses by



the instincts of self-preservation was reduced to a manifestation of narcissism, and thus the conflicts which overtly had no relation to sex were brought within the general theory of the libido and its development." Hart finds no fault with Freud's general attempt to reduce the dynamics of human conduct to the simplest possible terms, but he points out with obvious justice that from the evolutionary point of view we are obliged to build up man's instinctual life from the elements we find in animals; of these self-preservation and race-preservation are the chief. If we submit Freud's theory to the ordinary criteria of science we ask:

- (1) Are the facts as stated?
- (2) Are the concepts built up thereon valid?

The facts of psycho-analysis are, as we have seen in a previous chapter, obtained by the psycho-analytic method, and this method involves as an essential feature the transference in all its three stages. This transference is obviously and admittedly an affective relationship between analyst and analysand.

Freud writes: "The outcome in this

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struggle is . . . decided . . . solely by his (i.e. the patient's) relationship to the physician." Observe the outcome is not conditioned but decided by the relationship, and, further, decided by no other factor.

The way in which human evidence is susceptible of manifold distortion under any form of affective pressure, however slight, must be borne in mind. Experiments on the reliability of evidence have been made which prove that, even under favourable circumstances, human evidence has an average margin of error amounting to 25 per cent. "No certain line between actual reminiscence and phantasy can be drawn except by some measure of objective verification." Freud, as we have seen, recognized at an early stage of his investigations that the traumatic experiences related by his patients were often phantasies. He proceeded to study them in the same way as actual experiences, on the very proper assumption that an explanation must be sought for the patient's wish for such an experience. Similarly in the matter of dreams, he was indifferent whether the dream had been elaborated

after waking or not ; the phantasy mechanism at work was fundamentally the same. Hart is ready to grant the title of "fact of observation" to material which is not accurately related in accordance with actual experience. "It is quite another matter, however, when the flow of thought is not influenced by purely intra-psychic factors but by the intervention of the psycho-analyst." Furthermore, it is not merely a question of reliable evidence. "A lengthy investigation of a patient's mind means that one is no longer examining at the end of the investigation the object which one set out to observe, but an object which has progressively altered during the course of the investigation, and altered in a way which may have been largely determined by the investigation itself. This was the circumstance which vitiated absolutely and completely the painstaking conclusions drawn by Charcot and his school from the phenomena observed in the trained hysterics of the Salpêtrière." When we recall the essential features of the transference neurosis, the delicate duty imposed on the analyst of dissolving the transference, and the

"attempts to direct the patient's thought-processes", we must admit that such an alteration in the patient's mind may well be attributable to the treatment itself.

Freud himself says: "We have to admit that we have only abandoned hypnosis in our methods in order to discover suggestion again in the shape of the transference"; and again: "Analytic therapy takes hold deeper down nearer the roots of the disease, among the conflicts from which the symptoms proceed; it employs suggestion to change the outcome of these conflicts." We may also note that "while the pupils of Freud confirm by their clinical observations the findings of their master, the pupils of Jung, working with weapons forged of much the same material and in a closely similar pattern, have no difficulty in finding ample clinical confirmation for the quite disparate tenets of Jung."

It is admitted that the actual material of any psychological investigation is essentially different from the material studied in any other branch of science, in that objective verification of any subjective phenomenon is practically impossible. The

inference from this circumstance is not that Freud has devised a technique whereby the scientific method is completely applicable, but rather that psychology itself can never claim its place as a purely scientific study. A moment's consideration will remind us that there are important branches of study in which the scientific method is up to a certain point not only desirable but essential, and in which none the less it is by itself inadequate. Architecture is a case in point. The objective method is applicable to a certain point, but beyond that the æsthetic factor must be introduced, and of that factor no "objective verification" is possible. It is claimed that therapeutic results offer one line of confirmation, but no one who has taken the trouble to study cures by suggestion, hypnotism, Christian science and a multitude of religious healings can feel any serious conviction here. A form of treatment which necessitates anything from three hundred hours upwards of personal interviews alone with the healer can well derive therapeutic efficacy from some source less tangible than pure scientific analysis. It is also claimed that con-

firmation can be derived from the psycho-analytic study of folk-lore and mythology. It is to be noted, however, that anthropologists who do not belong to the Freudian school reject many of the psycho-analytic inferences. Finally, it is claimed that many of the findings of psycho-analysis are verified by the speech and actions of the insane. Here again many competent psychiatrists refuse to admit the validity of much of the evidence. "It must not be forgotten that subjective feelings of certainty in the followers of Freud are no substitute for the objective verifications which science must insistently demand. . . . The question at issue is no longer whether psychology is capable of achieving the necessary standards of science, but whether science is capable of fulfilling the requirements of psychology."

"It is," writes Crookshank, "by virtue of hypothesis and critical examination, and by re-inforcement of inference from experience, that psychology and psychotherapy become entitled to consideration as sciences."

If we begin by assuming that science and causality can fulfil the requirements

of psychology, we are obliged to follow every step of Freud's demonstration and argument in so far as these satisfy the criteria of science, and to accept also his negations implicit as well as explicit. But to many it will appear more reasonable to assume that purpose is as great a factor in human behaviour as cause. To them Freud's work can never be more than an investigation of the causal side of behaviour. This investigation they may accept as convincing or brilliant or epoch-making as they please, but partial it must remain because of the inapplicability of the causal hypothesis to the entire field of psychology. McDougall in a recent article writes: "The theory of strict determination of all events, in the sense that excludes creativeness and volition, was taught a generation ago by men of science and philosophers alike with a dogmatic confidence that the Pope of Rome himself might have envied. To-day it is gone, undermined, disreputable, shown to be nothing more than an irrational prejudice, or, at best, a methodological assumption."

Wexberg writes: "In the moment we leave the solid ground of biological pur-

posiveness, we leave scientific terra firma and become unwitting victims of undisciplined speculation."

Reference has already been made to that resistance to criticism which seems to be a characteristic of Freud's followers. No doubt they have had their patience severely tried by the numerous attacks of the uninformed and the prejudiced. Nevertheless, it is incontrovertible that the process of psycho-analysis by no means ensures in the finished product that most desirable attribute of criticizability. In this connection H. Weber writes : " It is paradoxical that the adherents of a method evolved in the attempt to free both thought and feeling from repression, should be intolerant of criticism. And yet analysts accept without trouble some difficult, even contradictory, statements with regard to energy, love, sex and so on when these are brought forward by Freud. This in itself suggests that, though they urge the necessity for breaking away from infantile fixations, yet here their general attitude is that of children to their father. . . . Their reluctance in accepting criticism by others makes one wonder whether it was less



intellectual appreciation than an emotional bias which made it possible for them to accept so easily his changed point of view."

Another general criticism which is not infrequent is directed against the pessimism and even cynicism which permeate much of psycho-analytic writings and utterances. Sir Percy Nunn writes: "I cannot think that the world will accept Freud's pessimistic philosophy of life as set forth in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*." Indeed this particular contribution has called forth more than its share of criticism. T. W. Mitchell, than whom no critic could be more friendly or just, writes of that work: "The pessimism which hangs like a cloud over the whole of this essay is perhaps the inevitable outcome of a belief, however achieved, in a mechanistic theory of life; and perhaps the criticism which will, in the end, invalidate Freud's arguments, may come, not from those who dispute the accuracy of his deductions, but from those who question the fundamental assumption on which all his reasoning rests—the assumption that all the phenomena of life and mind can be interpreted in terms of the physical sciences."

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This brings us to what is perhaps the most emphatic deficiency in Freud's whole system. There is no room in it for a creative factor. Jones, recognizing the deficiency, cuts the Gordian knot by denying the existence of a creative factor in human experience. He says: "We have no experience in either the physical or spiritual world of creation, for what masquerades as such always proves on closer inspection to be only transformation."

This certainly conforms to what one gathers from Freud's own writings. Freud talks of a higher civilization and in other ways refers to human progress as well as to artistic work. But the former is apparently to be the outcome of Super-Ego functioning, and the Super-Ego, as we have seen, represents conscience, a moral code, the parental tradition and so on. Works of art he discusses invariably from the reductive point of view and never seems to provide for possibility of true creation—i.e. *de novo*. From a philosophic point of view it is very hard to understand how human progress has been achieved at all with a psychical scheme such as Freud has constructed. Nor is it easy to attrib-

ute the whole of the artistic output of the race to sublimated libido, which merely transforms and produces an illusion of creation. It is to be noted, however, that some Freudian writers permit themselves to make use of the fictional concept of creation. For instance B. Low uses such phrases as: "the creative energy with which each individual is endowed"; "flights of artistic and spiritual creation"; "the *creative* rather than the *acquisitive* aspects of knowledge and power"; "his own creative work," etc., etc.

Yet the problem of social evolution is but a special instance of the general question of evolution. As we saw in a previous chapter, Freud in developing his theory of Eros and death-instincts reached the final conclusion that the goal of all life is death. Now this phenomenon is to be carefully studied. A scientist with a rigid conception of causality sets himself to investigate the human psyche. He does this with a high-power microscope as it were. But in his determination not to be prejudiced by any previous doctrine or theory he excludes the whole body of general

biological science. Other psychologists have begun by assuming that man has inherited a neuropsychic system from his animal ancestors, and have endeavoured to correlate human reactions with animal reactions, in so far as this is appropriate. Some observers have even carried such a correlation further than is logically possible. But Freud, studying the human mind in a peculiarly isolated way, makes inferences applicable to the whole animal kingdom. And so he comes to the conclusion that the goal of all organic life is neither self-preservation nor race-preservation, but annihilation. Where biologists and psychologists are endeavouring to clarify the problem of instincts in beast and man, Freud sweeps their work away or ignores it and reaches a conclusion which is admittedly incompatible with present-day science. One special instance deserves notice. It is generally accepted that man is a gregarious animal and that he owes this attribute to an instinctive tendency inherited from gregarious ancestors. But Freud has no compunction in sweeping such a doctrine aside. He announces that "The social sense arises from

identifications with others upon the grounds of similar ego-ideals." The verb "arises" is important. No doubt many psychologists would readily concede that the herd instinct in man is elaborated in many cases, if not always, on a basis of identification of ego-ideals. But here we are asked to believe that the origin of the herd reactions of man is one which cannot explain herd reactions in animals. Hence in this department there is no common factor between human and animal behaviour. Another example is Freud's theory of the development of the libido. Biologists are ready to admit that the purpose of self-preservation is subserved in the young animal by the attachment of a hedonic element to the functions of nutrition and excretion, and that the purpose of race-continuance is subserved by the presence of a hedonic factor in all genital functioning. Psychologists are no doubt ready to believe that these hedonic elements undergo processes of merging and displacement whereby the phenomena Freud has observed in the child could be accounted for. But once again we are asked to regard the whole series as mani-

festations of sex activity from the first and having apparently little in common with analogous phenomena in animals. Another example is to be found in the way Freud treats sadism and masochism. From the point of view of biological evolution it is fairly clear that survival value must be attributed to the two phenomena, namely enhancement of eroticism by discomfort or even pain on copulation in the female, and in the male an analogous enhancement on causing pain to the female. It must be admitted that without some such hedonic accentuation coition would frequently be abandoned. That which has a survival value in bi-sexual species below the human level is likely to persist, or at any rate to be represented, in the instinctive endowment of man. That this is the basis of sadism and masochism seems more than probable, yet Ferenczi, referring to Freud's theory of death-instincts, tells us that "only through this conception are we able to understand masochism."

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numerous points of contact between animal and human behaviour. Hence the isolation of psycho-analysis from other branches of biology and psychology. Particularly must we note how little contact there is with physiological psychology. When scientists are endeavouring to correlate human behaviour with cortical and sub-cortical function one might have hoped that Freud would have had a contribution to make. His elaborate scheme of the conscious and unconscious, of the Id and the Ego must one day stand or fall by the possibility or impossibility of co-ordinating it with the structure of the central nervous system. No doubt that day is still far off, but the psychological speculator who entirely ignores the physiological side of the picture, is putting himself at a disadvantage.

There is yet another aspect of psycho-analytic method that cannot commend itself to physiologist nor clinician. Freud, it is true, has thrown out a hint that some day the dynamics of the psyche may be reducible to chemical or endocrinological terms. It must, however, be obvious that psycho-analysis does nothing towards that

end. The literature is peculiarly silent in regard to these important factors in which psychiatrists and psychotherapists are so interested to-day. We read of the narcissism of the melancholic who no longer wants to live, but whether his thyroid is functioning plus or minus has no bearing on his behaviour so far as psycho-analysis is concerned. And, since it is a definite point in technique to make no physical examination and, so far as possible, not to discuss the health of the analysand, it is perfectly clear that we will look in vain to psycho-analysis for any help along this line of investigation. But even apart from endocrine correlations, the silence of psycho-analysis on constitutional factors is very striking. At a time when the trend of all scientific therapy is towards treating the whole man, it is strangely out of date to find specialism so narrow that it can take no notice of the physical condition, nor yet, for any practical purpose, of constitutional and temperamental factors. In his *Introductory Lectures* Freud refers to the vast subject in the following terms: "First of all there is the hereditary disposition—we do not often mention it

because it is so strongly emphasized in other quarters and we have nothing new to say about it. But do not suppose that we underestimate it; as practitioners we are well aware of its power. In any event we can do nothing to change it." Yet we do not find the sort of references to this subject that we would expect to find, as for instance that the ambivalence of manic depression is not curable by psycho-analysis, and similar indications. Even such references as do occur appear to be totally inadequate to the importance of this factor. Similarly, the student of genetics might perhaps complain that from all this vast and elaborate study of human personality few if any results have accrued to promote our knowledge of what mental traits are or are not transmissible. In this connection it is appropriate to quote the following passage. It is the conclusion to Rickman's exhaustive Survey of the Development of the Psycho-analytical Theory of the Psychoses. This survey appeared in the *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, vol. vi, part 4 to vol. vii, part 2.

"Mendel achieved his results by respect-

ing the individuality of every seed ; , he treated each one separately and studied its peculiarities both manifest and potential. The Mendelian theory is based on close examination of individual idiosyncrasies. In similar fashion Freud studied the separate elements in his patients' symptoms, dreams, slips of the tongue and gestures ; by the method of free association he related each of these elements to its presentational setting and elaborated a number of theories which bear the name psycho-analysis. The difference in method between Mendel and the scientific horticulturist lies in the method of approach. Mendel took them one at a time, the horticulturist in large quantities ; the former discovered certain mechanisms inherent in the particular, the latter properties shared by the general ; the former was concerned with endoplasmic processes, the latter predominantly with exoplasmic processes, relation to soil, light, etc. It is much the same in respect to the psycho-analyst and the psychiatrist ; the former is almost wholly concerned with endopsychic processes, the latter—if the literature and the discussions in societies are a guide—with

exopsychic processes, biochemistry, histology, dietetics, pharmacology, etc. I do not know what the scientific horticulturist has to contribute to the pure discipline of genetics, but what the 'Mendelians' have to contribute to horticulture is well enough known. In the same way, I do not know what the psychiatrists have to add to psycho-analysis (unless they adopt the technique of investigation); I have tried to outline here some of the things the Freudians have to offer to psychiatry.

"The tendency of psychiatry up to the present time has been to turn for help to the methods of the physical sciences, which resolve themselves to number, measure and scales. This direction follows a mental tendency which employs the 'reckoning apparatus' and is based on egoistic or, if one prefers, intellectual impulses (I am using both terms in rather a special way); psycho-analysis now has to offer another method, which does not enumerate, measure or weigh; it deals only with presentations in the mind and tries to find by its technique how they are *arranged*, how they *interact*, and how they take effect in be-

haviour. A proper combination of the two methods is the inevitable destiny of psychiatry : at present there seems no way of fusing the two, so the clinician is obliged to use the two alternately, viewing now the psychical, now the chemical, regarding the patient at one moment ontogenetically, at the next as a subject of statistical research. . . . The Freudian school . . . stands as self-contained and independent as chemistry did fifty years ago."

The reader may be left to draw from this statement his own conclusions as to the attitude of the psycho-analytic school to contemporary and allied science. It is worth noting, however, that Rickman looks forward to a time when the psycho-analyst himself will be able to acquire "binocular vision," though he states that for the present such a possibility is out of the question.

In conclusion, brief reference must be made to the moralists' criticism of psycho-analysis. In *The Ego and the Id* Freud writes : "Psycho-analysis has been reproached time after time with ignoring the higher, moral, spiritual side of human nature. The reproach is doubly unjust,



both historically and methodologically. For, in the first place, we have from the very start attributed the function of instigating repression to the moral and æsthetic tendencies in the Ego, and secondly, there has been a general refusal to recognize that psycho-analytic research could not produce a complete and finished body of doctrine, like a philosophical system, ready made, but had to find its way step by step along the path towards understanding the intricacies of the mind by making an analytic dissection of both normal and abnormal phenomena. . . . Now that we have embarked upon the analysis of the Ego we can give an answer to all those whose moral sense has been shocked and who have complained that there must surely be a higher nature in man : ‘ Very true,’ we can say, ‘ and here we have that higher nature, in this ego-ideal or super-ego, the representative of our relation to our parents. When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired them and feared them ; and later we took them into ourselves.’

“ The ego-ideal, therefore, is the heir of the Œdipus complex and thus it is also the

expression of the most powerful impulses and most important vicissitudes experienced by the libido in the Id. . . .

“It is easy to show that the ego-ideal answers in every way to what is expected of the higher nature of man. In so far as it is a substitute for the longing for a father, it contains the germ from which all religions have evolved. The self-judgment which declares that the Ego falls short of its ideal produces the sense of worthlessness with which the religious believer attests his longing.”

We must remind the reader that the ego-ideal is used as a synonym for the Super-Ego. We saw in the first chapter that it is the moral critic that rules the Ego, and also that it tends to be tyrannical. The passage quoted reveals, perhaps more than any other, that Freud's conception of religion is purely traditional. In so far as religion consists merely in a sense of guilt and a compulsion to live up to the standard enjoined by the parents, Freud's explanation is conceivably correct. But what many would like to know is whether Freud has any explanation for the phenomena of religion that do not come under these head-

ings, such phenomena as may be appropriately grouped under the heading of "the creative vision"? Or is it once more a case of cutting the Gordian knots by denying their existence? McDougall says: "There is nothing more obstructive to the advance of knowledge than a certain unformulated dogma implicitly accepted by many men of science, namely, the dogma that what we cannot fully understand cannot happen."

We may suitably conclude this chapter by a quotation from Lawrence Hyde, who writes in *The Learned Knife*: "Narrow sectarianism, religious prudery, persistent concentration on one set of symbols and their crudely literal interpretation, do but indicate repressions in the psyche which can be explained with a good deal of plausibility in terms of modern scientific psychology. . . . It is to be observed that when writers like, for instance, Mr. Wells, Mr. Bernard Shaw or Mr. Bertrand Russell wish to exhibit the wretchedly limited character of the religious attitude, we never find them attacking the beliefs of such people as Coleridge, Newman, Eucken or Professor Otto."

## CHAPTER III

### ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY (JUNG)

(1) *The Structure of the Mind.* If Adler's Individual Psychology differs from Freud's Psycho-analysis, Jung's Analytical Psychology differs from them both in every respect. Like Adler, Jung was at one time a disciple of Freud's, and like Adler, he diverged very soon from Freudian theory. We have seen that in Metapsychology Freud has gone beyond the limits of psychology and studied problems that may be regarded as philosophic. Jung has done so to a much greater extent. Indeed, it would perhaps have been desirable that his system should have been described as a philosophy rather than a psychology. In this connection Crookshank writes : " The Zurich school of Jung no longer has psychotherapeutic actuality : it represents a philosophy which, for appreciation, requires esoteric association

with the Master." In spite of the similarity of name, it is not so much to Freud's system of thought that Jung's bears fundamental resemblance, as to Bergson's. Jung shares Freud's view that the conscious mind is only a fraction of the human psyche, the unconscious being by far the more extensive portion, as it is the more important. He regards the unconscious as being so because it has not yet been fully adapted to reality. According to this view, human evolution may be considered as a progressive adaptation to reality of the entire resources, ontogenetic and phylogenetic, of each individual. In other words, evolution consists in the enlargement of consciousness. Unconscious thought is nascent thought, as opposed to the elaborated product of the conscious mind.

Nicole gives the following résumé of Jung's views on the Conscious and the Unconscious :

" Jung further found that, in protracted analyses, any particular symbol might recur with disconcerting persistency, but would gradually become divested of all associative relation with any of the patient's personal experiences, and would

approximate more and more to those primitive and universal symbols such as are found in myths and legends. This led him to suspect that the unconscious is not only composed . . . of material which has been repressed from consciousness, but also contains elements which are not referable to personal experience, have never been conscious, and are archaic and universal—these being explainable on the assumption of a racial memory. . . . Everyone is endowed with a primitive unconscious which is ‘universal,’ ‘impersonal,’ ‘collective’ and ‘archaic,’ and which contains, potentially at least, all the possible attributes of the human mind, the evil and the good, the low and the lofty, the demoniacal and the divine. As personal development proceeds certain elements from this impersonal unconscious become conscious; as consciousness further enlarges more and more is brought up from the primitive unconscious. These elements that thus become conscious—really excerpts from the collective psyche—become personal in so far as they are the guiding factors for personal adaptation; the primitive unconscious, of course,

always remains impersonal. . . . 'Personal' contents, both conscious and unconscious, can yet hardly be called 'individual' for they are ultimately but a selection from the elements found in the primitive or 'collective' unconscious. . . . What is individual, however, is the *selective process* by means of which these, rather than any other contents, have been withdrawn from the impersonal unconscious and made personal."

The Ego is the focal point of consciousness and the perceptual factor in self-awareness. The subject or the self is differentiated from the Ego, because it includes the entire psyche, both conscious and unconscious. Jung gives a somewhat special meaning to personality. The *persona* of Roman actors was the mask that hid the actor's face from the spectators. He speaks of the "persona" as that part of consciousness which is exposed to the gaze of the outer world. It may correspond closely to what the individual conceives himself to be (Freud's ego-phantasy). It is not, however, the same as his character, which includes the important unconscious elements. In so far as the individual

regards himself as identical with the persona—i.e. if the Ego is equated with the persona—then the individual has a minimal knowledge of himself. In consequence he is liable to be as surprised as his neighbours will be, when he conducts himself in a way that is incompatible with his reputation, though it is strictly compatible with his real character.

The personal unconscious derives its content from personal experience in three ways :

(a) By repression—that which is neglected in development or rejected by the conscious.

(b) From unapprehended personal experience.

(c) By simple forgetting—i.e. all ideas that have “lost a certain energetic value.”

The racial unconscious is the deposit of the racial heritage—the accumulated and transmitted reactivity of living protoplasm. It can thus be conceived of as having a basic layer representing animal life in general, then a layer representing primate ancestors, then large ethnological groups (e.g. Mongolian, Aryan, etc.), then nations



and clans, and, finally, the family heritage.

From the conception of repression Jung passes to a point that is nodal in his whole psychology, namely that the unconscious owing to its origin is compensatory to the conscious. What is strong in the conscious is weak in the unconscious; the man who is timid in the conscious is brave in the unconscious, and so on. As the unconscious contains both noble and ignoble elements excluded from the conscious, it follows that every man is both better and worse than he thinks himself to be. Every exaggeration in the persona—bravado, asceticism, pedantry, etc.—has its counterpart in the unconscious and that counterpart is ever pressing upwards to emerge and thereby correct the conscious state. The psychopathology of everyday life affords illustrations of the way in which this compensatory or corrective function of the unconscious seizes every opportunity to rectify the conscious.

The racial unconscious contains all the instinctual life of man. As the germ cells have passed in an unbroken continuum from the first living organism, so they have

carried with them the imprint of ancestral experience and modes of reaction. But Jung carries the idea further and believes that this racial heritage also contains man's interpretation of his experience. Hence the new-born babe has in his unconscious nothing personal, but a mass of phylogenetic material which may be classed under three heads :

- (1) Instinctive reactions.
- (2) Ancestral modes of behaviour (which may be equivalent to conditioned reflexes).
- (3) Ancestral interpretations of experience.

This last category covers all the primitive explanations of the forces of nature—gods, demons, spirits, etc.—and the mythology into which they were woven, which crops up in strangely consistent forms all over the world. These unconscious ideas Jung calls archetypes. Just as elements in the personal unconscious tend to irrupt in consciousness, so material from the racial unconscious presses upward, finding expression chiefly in the dream life.

The content of the racial unconscious is regarded as transformations of the primal sexual libido. Thus as man devoted him-

self, in his long evolutionary history to one new occupation after another he borrowed, as it were, libido for the purpose. In so doing he desexualized it. But he continued to picture his new activities in the imagery of the old sexual libido. That is to say, the language of the archetypes is largely a language of sexual symbols. Perhaps a simple example may serve to clarify the point. In engineering works it is usual to speak of certain screws that fit into certain sockets as "male" and "female" respectively. That is, the analogy of sex functioning is resorted to for descriptive purposes. Jung would regard such use of analogy as evidence that the primal force applied to the subject was originally sexual in character. If this process takes place without injury to the individual's adaptation it is called sublimation, but if it is not successful it constitutes repression.

It is, of course, understood that the racial unconscious is entirely inaccessible to the individual by ordinary methods of introspection and recollection. This conception of the racial unconscious as a phylogenetic neme—"illimitable because it can forget

nothing"—is still further extended into the generating ground of all future possibilities. All creative possibilities, and indeed all the dynamic powers of the psyche issue from it.

Jung's conception of the unconscious becomes very involved when he describes it as being a replica, as it were, of the conscious—or rather vice versa. Corresponding to the Ego in consciousness there is a shadow of the Ego which constitutes the focal point of the racial unconscious. This shadow is said to play an important part in dreams as a sort of caricature of the dreamer. Corresponding to the persona of the conscious life there is an *anima* or *animus*. The man has an *anima* which constitutes the feminine attributes which do not appear in his personal make-up. Similarly, the woman has an *animus* which represents her undifferentiated masculinity. But the two are not exactly comparable. Because the woman is consciously monogamous, her unconscious is polygamous as a compensation. Her *animus* is therefore multiform. It corresponds to the rational and masculine principle, and the more feminine a woman appears to be the more

numerous will be the male presentations of her *animus* in the unconscious. George Eliot is perhaps an example of an active and multiform *animus*, while William Sharpe's Fiona Macleod was the distillation of his *anima*.

We thus have the complicated conception of a psyche which is partly conscious, partly unconscious. On the conscious side it presents the persona to external reality. On the unconscious it presents either an *anima* or a plurality of *animi* to the collective unconscious. The focal point of the conscious is the Ego, while that of the unconscious is the shadow. The unconscious itself is divided into personal and racial, and between these there is an absolute barrier, while a much less rigid threshold divides the personal unconscious from the conscious.

The focal point of the entire system—as opposed to the Ego and the shadow—is the individual; this corresponds to the total differentiation of the entire self, and comprises both personal and racial elements and is thus more important, as it is more elusive, than the Ego or the shadow. This last conception is perhaps

the most abstruse of all, and is strongly reminiscent of Oriental philosophy.

The libido, to Jung, is a primal and universal life force ; it is transformable and conceived of as being more or less constant, in potential. It corresponds closely to Bergson's *élan vital*. Jung's argument for extending the conception of the libido was based on his work on dementia præcox. His researches convinced him that while hysteria and the psycho-neuroses might be accounted for in terms of withdrawal of libido (in the Freudian sense), it was not possible to explain in a similar way such psychoses as paranoia and dementia præcox. In these latter forms the failure of adaptation is much more fundamental. Therefore adaptation to reality is to be regarded solely in terms of sexuality, or else the libido is to be regarded as something much wider than sex—namely objective interest in general. He therefore applies the term to the primal vital force out of which all instincts have been differentiated. He describes it as “ a life impulse, a will to live, which will attain the creation of the whole species through the preservation of the individual.” The libido is

innate in the individual with its phylogenetic differentiation. That is to say, parts of the primal vital force have become in the course of evolution desexualized and applied to functions not directly sexual. Hence in dementia præcox the failure of the adaptation to reality is conditioned by the withdrawal of "an already differentiated and desexualized quantity of libido, which, among normal people, has belonged to the function of reality ever since prehistoric times."

Jung has elaborated the study of the transformations of the libido in the unconscious. He traces these in anthropology and mythology, by the symbolism of cult and folk-lore. He deduces from this the conclusion that altruism is as innate in man as is egoism—since man was always gregarious. Morality is therefore a "function of the human soul, which is as old as humanity itself."

This, then, presents a striking contrast to Freud's view. As we have seen, the psycho-analytic school conceives the real conflict as between the libido in the unconscious and the socialized standards of the conscious. Jung, on the other hand, pic-

tures the possibilities of the conflict within the individual and quite independent of external pressure.

(2) *Psychological Types*. In 1914 Jung described what he termed two psychological types—the extravert and the introvert. He attributes the conception to an Englishman—F. Jordan, who in 1896 published a book called *Character as seen in Body and Parentage*. This volume was brought to Jung's notice by one of his first English disciples, the late Dr. Constance Long, in 1913. At that time Jung was facing the problem of inherited psychic traits as is manifested in the following passage: "There are neurotics who have shown their increased sensitiveness and their resistance against adaptation in the very first weeks of life, in their difficulty in taking the mother's breast and in their exaggerated nervous reactions. For this portion of a neurotic predisposition it will always be impossible to find a psychological etiology, for it is anterior to all psychology. But this predisposition—you may call it 'congenital sensitiveness' or by what name you like—is the cause of the first resistances against adaptation. In such



case, the way of adaptation being blocked, the biological energy we call *libido* does not find its appropriate outlet or activity, and therefore replaces an up-to-date and suitable form of adaptation by an abnormal or primitive one." So far Jung was merely dealing with Janet's conception of the psychasthenic temperament—a conception which Freud had largely set aside. But from Jordan's book Jung derived the inspiration for the next step in type-psychology—the contrast of extravert and introvert.

Mitchell says : " The heretical nature of Jung's departure from psycho-analytic doctrine becomes more apparent when we consider the slight emphasis he lays upon repression, and the nature and source of the conflict to which he attributes the occurrence of neurosis. The personal unconscious is not the result of repression following conflict but is merely a consequence of the tendency of every individual to develop one-sidedly in his mental growth. In adaptation to life one part of his potentialities is neglected in favour of the other and the neglected part tends to become unconscious. This doctrine, so

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subversive of psycho-analytic teaching, is part of Jung's theory of psychological types. When he first put forward his views on this topic he distinguished two types into which all human beings can be classed—the extravert and introvert. In the extravert the fundamental function is feeling, in the introvert it is thought. In the extravert the potentialities of thought tend to be unconscious, and in the introvert the potentialities of feeling tend to be unconscious—just in so far as these potentialities are undeveloped in the conscious life.

“According to Jung some adaptations to life require more thought than feeling, while others require more feeling than thought; and a conflict may lead to neurosis when the introvert is faced by situations that demand feeling more than thought, or when the extravert is called upon for more thought than feeling. It is a conflict between the function by which adaptation is ordinarily made, and the opposite function which through neglect has been allowed to become unconscious.”

This description is too simple to meet Jung's present type-psychology. The mal-

adaptation which shows itself in a neurosis is regarded as due to the over-development of the superior function, and this need not necessarily be either thought or feeling. When the maximum amount of libido has been drawn from the inferior functions, they appear to suspend their compensatory (and in a sense co-operative) function and become antagonistic, destructive and, moreover, to sink to a primitive level in the unconscious. "When an obstacle occurs in life which the libido cannot overcome, it is heaped up in the unconscious and thus causes tension between the pairs of opposites."

This classification is comparable to William James's Tough and Tender types. The interest of the extravert is primarily directed outwards, that of the introvert inwards; the former is chiefly objective, the latter subjective. The extravert has facility of self-expression, the introvert lacks it. The extravert tends to have more self-confidence than is justified by the facts; the introvert tends to have less. The extravert is self-seeking in the sense that he likes other people to think and act as he does—he may be a propagandist;

the introvert is detached and remains content to go his way and let others go theirs. The extravert is stimulated by publicity, and tends therefore to perform best when he is under observation; the introvert, on the other hand, is more often paralysed by the presence of an audience, his best work being done when he is unobserved. The extravert contemplates opportunity in the light of scope for expression, while the introvert regards it primarily from the point of view of responsibility. The first thoughts of the one type are generally the second thoughts of the other. Thus we get the familiar pictures of the eager man who enthusiastically embraces an opportunity without thinking till next day of the responsibility entailed, and of the cautious man about whom we say: "He's sure to refuse at first, but if you give him time he'll accept." From all this it will be obvious that the extravert is essentially gregarious and the introvert fundamentally solitary. The introvert tends therefore to assume an attitude of self-defence against the objective world, including of course his fellow-creatures.

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While these two types are described according to their conscious attitude, Jung claims that the unconscious attitude of each is the reverse. Thus the introvert retreats in the face of the object which he fears may limit his freedom; unconsciously he becomes dominated by it, and may in reality sacrifice his freedom to a much greater extent than if he had met it in reality. For example, the introvert who has a suspicion that there is insanity in his family history, may develop an insanity phobia. He may shrink from investigating the facts, he may evade some incidental opportunity of visiting a mental hospital, he may leave the room when the conversation turns to this subject. But all the time he is becoming more and more dominated by the fear. While he is escaping from actual contact with and conscious contemplation of insanity, he is endeavouring to "put the fear out of his mind." The result is that his unconscious becomes more and more dominated by the fear, and in effect he is less free than if he had openly dealt with his problem. On the other hand, the extravert may meet life with an adventurous spirit and appear

to be particularly free and "captain of his soul," but in point of fact his bold advance is partly stimulated by the inner dread of being alone, marooned in his own life and faced with his own unconscious. Hence the dependence or independence of each type is more apparent than real. Each compensates in the unconscious for the attitude in the conscious. The extravert withdraws from his own subjective life and the introvert from the objective world. In each case the compensatory effect of the unconscious is obstructive or corrective. The extravert may be thwarted in his violent external activity by some neurotic manifestation; the introvert may find that his own subjective life drives him out again to a closer contact with the world of reality.

From these two main types (now called "general attitude-types") Jung proceeded to a further subdivision, according to the psychic function that predominates. He describes four functions—thinking, feeling, intuition and sensation. Every individual possesses these four functions, but it is always possible to recognize a "superior function" and an "inferior" one. The





thinking type is of course rational, logical and detached. The feeling type depends on feeling for adaptation and valuation. The intuitive type depends on unconscious inferences and is therefore quick and alert, but not necessarily wise. The sensorial type is unduly influenced by sense impressions of every kind. Each function has an opposite; thought is opposed to feeling, and intuition to sensation. If, therefore, thought is the superior function, feeling will be the inferior. If intuition is the superior function, then sensation will be the inferior, and vice versa. Between these polar opposites lie the other two functions; thus, if the superior function be sensation, thinking and feeling will both be better developed than intuition. We can thus produce a diagrammatic scheme of the four functions (Fig. 2).

To this scheme must be added four compromise forms of functioning. They are :

(1) Between thinking and sensation, empirical thinking.

(2) Between sensation and feeling, emotional feeling.



(3) Between feeling and intuition, intuitive feeling.

(4) Between intuition and thinking, speculative thinking.

There is thus a sort of bridge whereby passage is easy from any one function to the other two which are not its polar opposites. To clarify this point we may elaborate our diagram as in Fig. 3.

Having established the four function types, Jung proceeded to further elaboration by describing each function type as either introverted or extraverted. We may outline these *seriatim*.

(1) *The introverted thinker* with his subjective bias is more taken up with the idea of any fact than with the fact itself. He is essentially theoretical; his detachment gives him an air of great aloofness, indeed he may display intellectual arrogance to a marked extent. He is tactless because he lacks intuition, cold because he lacks feeling, inhuman because he is so devoid of sensation. His introversion drives him away from his fellows because he is afraid of all external reality. Hence he assumes a defensive attitude in dogmatism and intellectual self-assertion. If he were more

confident of his own powers of coping with external reality, he would not be so afraid of adverse criticism, and would in consequence be less reluctant to meet his fellow-creatures on a more human plane. As a scientist or thinker he tends to evolve his theory in his own mind and then go out to find examples to support it.

(2) *The extravert thinker* is a realist or at any rate claims to be so. He deals in facts, and he respects little else. He tends to become intolerant and fanatical. Those who do not agree with him must be knaves or fools. He is always in quest of a formula, and when he has found one he makes the most of it. He is by far the commonest type amongst politicians of every class and nation. When he has reached a formula by what he conceives to be incontrovertible logic he soon attempts to propagate his views with great insistence. Shibboleths, like teetotalism, prohibition, disarmament, free trade, are in the main championed and expounded by extravert thinkers. Because he believes himself to be such a logical thinker and to have excluded sentiment from his scheme of things, his unconscious reacts with much

feeling, generally of an infantile order; he is likely to be superstitious and he is frequently very sensitive to any sort of criticism. As a scientist he tends to collect his observations first and then to seek to frame his theory from the observed facts. In this way he reverses the process used by the introvert thinker. Charles Darwin is cited as a good example.

(3) *The introverted feeling type* is more frequently seen in women than men. People of this type live by affective valuation. They like or dislike, love or hate with great intensity. Because of their introversion they lack facility of expressing these powerful feelings. They live, more than any other introverted type, in terror of being dominated by the object. Hence their approach to it is always clumsy and often fruitless. In consequence they are continually misunderstood. They are lonely far beyond what they desire. They are considered hard and selfish, when in point of fact they are neither.

(4) *The extraverted feeling type* is also more common in women. These people are objective, conventional, social. They tend to enjoy and admire the same things

and people as their neighbours do. They are so objective in their feeling life that there is almost an identification with the object. They differ widely from the introverted feeling types in that they express so much feeling that they have little or none left for their own subjective life. Thinking is largely unconscious. As a result of this, logical judgments on the objects of feeling have an awkward way of emerging into consciousness and upsetting the easy stream of affective expression. There are some people whose "swans are always turning out to be geese." Sometimes we say it is because they are so suggestible. With the extravert feeling type suggestibility is bound to be exaggerated. They discover that their swans are geese when the unconscious thinking process has succeeded in forcing its verdict into consciousness. "

(5) *The introverted sensorial type* appreciates the good things of life, from auditive to the Seventh Symphony; he takes his pleasures gloomily and perhaps rather pompously. No one would guess that behind his apparent self-possession there lurks constant uneasiness. This uneasiness

is due to his projection of subjective and archetypal fears and fancies on to the object which he senses. These people often surprise their friends by bizarre similes and metaphors from Nature. They perceive in the external world so much that is personal in addition to that which is impersonal.

(6) *The extravert sensorial type* is quite different. His life is entirely conditioned by his objective environment. Of all psychological types he is the most easily bored. His personal resources are minimal. He demands constant external stimulus. He has no patience with any pursuit or theory that involves the abstract. He may be either sensual or refined in his perceptual values. He is always a discriminating critic of sense impressions. He may appreciate second-rate music and even second-rate women, but rarely second-rate port or a second-rate horse. He may be well meaning and is often very genial, but he is capable of much unkindness, partly because his gross lack of intuition makes him inconsiderate and partly because the infantility of his unconscious maintains an uneasy sense that others are

trying to get the better of him. He is apt to pride himself on a shrewdness which in effect he lacks entirely, and over-compensates by pursuing his childish suspicions in stupid and crass ways.

(7) *The introverted intuitive type* is the polar opposite of the extravert sensorial. He has little concern for external facts. His world is primarily subjective and possibilities rather than actualities absorb him. He spends his life "reading between the lines." He projects so much of his unconscious on to the external world that it may tremble with magic. The Northern Celts afford many examples of introverted intuition, and an admirable picture of such a type is Cameron, the boatman, in Barrie's *Mary Rose*. People of this type usually display great courtesy and often dignity. They are frequently unstable in their friendships and loyalties, and may even appear to be treacherous. Their inconstancy is largely temperamental. To them situations change radically when other types see no alteration. Prophets must be intuitive as surely as priests must lack intuition. And as prophets and priests will never reach complete under-



standing of each other, so the intuitive types, but particularly the introverted intuitive, will never understand nor be understood of other types.

(8) *The extravert intuitive* is unstable like the introvert intuitive, but his instability is more obvious. He is always seeking a change. His dissatisfaction with anything static makes him welcome change and he obtains the reputation of an optimist. He tends to be a gambler because he is attracted by possibilities of gain and has not enough rational insight to see the folly of gambling. His strength of inner conviction expresses itself in manifold external assurances. He is therefore liable to make serious mistakes in marriage, because he is impulsive, positive that he is right and yet attracted by one single feature in the mate, while he remains blind to the general situation as it actually is. He is essentially an opportunist and he makes his way in the world by a combination of hopeful agility and childish obstinacy. This obstinacy is his only defence when he is faced with plain facts and direct logic. But the extravert intuitive is after all the best type to depend on in an emergency,

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and therefore all fire-brigades might suitably be recruited from this type. Racially the type is best exemplified in the Southern Celt.

It will be realized from this description of the eight pure types, that there is no little difficulty in classifying many of our fellow-creatures. This difficulty is partly enhanced and partly mitigated by Jung's view of the *co-function*. He claims that there is usually a second function developed in consciousness to an extent which produces a character of mixed type. The co-function must always be one of two—it can never be the polar opposite. Thus a thinking type may have a co-function of sensation or intuition but not of feeling. An intuitive type may have a co-function of thinking or feeling but not of sensation. Finally this amplified scheme becomes still more complex—and therefore more adequate—when it is realized that one function may be introverted and the co-function extraverted or vice versa. Thus an extravert feeling type may have a co-function of introverted intuition, or an introvert sensorial type may have a co-function of extraverted thinking.

Two points may be raised in considering this very elaborate classification of character. The first is how far does its author attribute these qualities to innate or constitutional factors and how far to any modification that may have resulted from experience in childhood or later? The answer is that Jung attributes type-function and type-attitude to inherited and not acquired factors. It would appear that sometimes a child may be moulded into an opposite type, but the result is that sooner or later neurotic maladjustment will ensue. Jung compares the introvert and extravert to two biological types: the extravert is the fertile and defenceless: the introvert is the infertile individual with highly developed resources of self-preservation. Just as the balance of organic life requires the presence of both types, so a human community needs both introverts and extraverts. It is claimed, however, that psychological analysis, by making the individual aware of his type tendencies, can go some way towards ensuring a more balanced functioning of the whole psyche.

(3) *Dreams*. Jung's treatment of the dream differs from that of psycho-analysis

just as fundamentally as we would expect. Freud's causality and determinism limit his interpretation of the dream to pure reduction. That is to say, the content of the dream is reduced to those antecedent experiences which have produced it. Jung's belief that all functions of the psyche are purposive, enables him to treat the dream not only as a symbolized account of what has happened, but also as symbolic guidance for the present and future. Since he takes the view that the unconscious is incessantly exercising a compensatory function, it is reasonable that he should regard the dream as an expression of this corrective tendency. Freud reduces the dream to an expression of an unsatisfied childish wish which is cast in symbolic form so as the better to elude the censor as well as to safeguard sleep. To Jung it is this, but a great deal more. One might say that it is a cartoon of the present situation and also an allegory with a pointed moral. It is couched in emblems and symbols because the unconscious is primitive and the language is the language of archetypes. Perhaps the most crucial difference lies in the handling of sexual

symbols. A tower, a lamp-post, a walking-stick may represent the erect phallus. That is conceded on both sides. But there Freud stops. Jung, on the other hand, says we have only got as far as an archetypal image which in the language of primitive man connotes virility and all that virility implies of spiritual attributes.

“The unconscious background does not remain inactive, but betrays itself by certain characteristic effects upon the conscious contents. For example, it creates phantasy-products of a peculiar character, which are in most cases easily referable to certain subterranean sexual representations. Or it effects certain characteristic disturbances of the conscious process, which are likewise reducible to repressed contents. . . . Freud’s reductive method . . . collects all the circumstantial evidence of the unconscious backgrounds and . . . reconstructs the elementary, unconscious, instinctive processes. Those conscious contents . . . are by Freud incorrectly termed symbols. These are not true symbols, however, since, according to his teaching, they have merely the rôle of signs or symptoms of the background

processes. The true symbol differs essentially from this, and should be understood as the expression of an intuitive perception which can as yet neither be apprehended better, nor expressed differently. When, for example, Plato expresses the whole problem of the theory of cognition in his metaphor of the cave, or when Christ expresses the idea of the Kingdom of Heaven in his parables, these are genuine and true symbols; namely, attempts to express a thing for which there exists as yet no adequate verbal concept. If we were to interpret Plato's metaphor in the manner of Freud we should naturally come to the uterus, and we should have proved that even the mind of Plato was deeply stuck in the primeval levels of 'infantile sexuality.' But in doing so we should also remain in total ignorance of what Plato actually created from the primitive antecedents of his philosophical intuition; we should, in fact, carelessly have overlooked his most essential product, merely to discover that he had 'infantile' phantasies like every other mortal. Such a conclusion could possess value only for the man who regards Plato as a super-human

being, and who is therefore able to find a certain satisfaction in the fact that even Plato was also a man. . . . But this would have nothing whatever to do with the meaning of the Platonic parable."

Jung eliminates the censor, as his conception of the relation between conscious and unconscious is very different from Freud's. He recognizes that "the symbol is not merely a sign of something repressed and concealed, but is at the same time an attempt to comprehend and point out the way of the further psychological development of the individual." This prospective treatment of the dream is quite irreconcilable with Freudian views.

In so far as the neurotic is a regressive, his dreams represent an archaic presentation of the progressive solution from which he has retreated. Maeder writes: "In the dreams of neurotics we can recognize the drowned voices of progression."

In referring to this theory Freud says: "If those who speak of this 'prospective tendency' mean thereby to characterize the unconscious mental activity to which the latent thoughts belong, then, on the one hand, they tell us nothing new and,

on the other hand, the description is not exhaustive ; for unconscious mental activity occupies itself with many other things besides preparation for the future."

To Jung the dream still constitutes the royal road to the unconscious, whereas Freud now lays greater stress on the interpretation of transference phenomena.

"The dream is a variety of phantasy. It is the persistence in us of a primitive method of thinking that as adults we have abandoned. . . . It will therefore be seen that when we are dealing with a neurosis which has been caused by a regression of psychic energy from a task in reality, with the consequent reanimation of some infantile attitude, the dreams of the patient will be of value, because they will contain those phantasies which have *replaced* the effort of achievement that was demanded by reality. They will contain the germ of the solution of the problem, not in terms of adult thinking but in terms of infantile or primitive thinking."

Jung regards the dream as the continuation of the process of reflection and introspection which should be evoked by every situation in the waking state. But



because most of us are so lacking in contact with our personal unconscious, the process is taken up and elaborated from the point at which it ceased. From this it follows that the dream life of an extravert sensorial type will be of a much more obvious and elementary character than that of the introvert intuitive. And this is one of the reasons for Jung's claim that though the introvert can help the extravert by psychological analysis, no extravert can help an introvert, simply because he cannot understand his unconscious life.

Another point in Jung's view of dreams is the distinction he makes between objective and subjective interpretation. It is claimed that dreams which emanate from the personal unconscious deal with memories, actual incidents, real persons and the individual's experience in general. These can be objectively interpreted because they refer through the dreamer's associations to actual situations. On the other hand, dreams from the racial unconscious have to be interpreted subjectively because they deal with the dreamer's own attributes and tendencies. It is alleged by the Freudians that analysts of the Zurich school indulge

in dogmatic dream interpretation *ex cathedra*. It is hard to see how it can be otherwise, despite the fact that Jung claims that a symbol may have a different meaning for every dreamer. Jung obviously uses a mass of classical, mythological and anthropological erudition in interpreting subjective dreams. This material is by no means always available to the dreamer, as for instance when he tells the dreamer that a bull is a mithraic symbol. Even conceding this to be true, the fact remains that one link in the interpretation of the dream has been supplied by the analyst. Such a procedure would be contrary to strict Freudian technique.

There is one class of dream which Jung has treated with very interesting results—the birth dream. Whereas the Freudian school deals to a considerable extent with the birth trauma,<sup>11</sup> Jung regards birth dreams as analogous to birth myths and as representing an important and universal human conception—re-birth. He has indicated the numerous myths, belonging to nearly every human race, in which the theme of re-birth occurs. It represents a primitive attitude of human limitation.

The situation in reality cannot be adequately met by mobilizing the available resources of the individual. He must make an entirely new beginning, he must "enter again into his mother's womb," he must face the melting-pot. His present lines of adaptation can take him no further, he must start from scratch again. Of course no such interpretation would be accepted by the Freudian school, but it is noteworthy that many psychotherapists who adhere to neither school confirm Jung's views of re-birth dreams.

(4) *Psychopathology and Treatment.* Jung's view of functional nervous disorders inevitably differs from Freud's. He recognizes repression, as we have seen. He also makes use of the concept of regression, but in a somewhat different way. Jung regards the individual as regressing from reality when his libido sinks back into the unconscious. But so far the process is not necessarily a morbid one. The retreat into phantasy may be merely a matter of "*reculer pour mieux sauter*," for phantasy thinking is the condition of creation, and from it may arise a creative adaptation which allows the individual to surmount

his obstacle. But when the phantasy thinking results in nothing creative but merely re-activates earlier or infantile patterns of thought, then the neurotic state has been established. "The archaic replaces the recent function that has failed." "Take away the obstacle in the path of life and this whole system of infantile phantasies at once breaks down and becomes again as inactive and ineffective as before. . . . Therefore I no longer find the cause of the neurosis in the past, but in the present. I ask what the necessary task is which the patient will not accomplish. . . . For the neurotic there is no established way, for his aims and tasks are apt to be of a highly individual character. He tries to follow the more or less uncontrolled and half-conscious way of normal people, not fully realizing his own critical and very different nature, which imposes upon him more effort than the normal person is required to exert." These infantile attitudes constitute primitive and immature adaptations which present themselves in the conduct of the adult as evasions, compromises or retreats from the demands of the present situation.

The actual effect on the patient's reactions will be conditioned by his type. Hysteria belongs essentially to the extravert. His—or as is more probable, her—symptoms are directed to influencing the demand of life upon her. She dramatizes her inability to surmount the obstacle, and, like the child that she really is, deflects the disapproval of her audience and endeavours to turn it into compassion. The introvert, on the other hand, develops an anxiety neurosis. His main concern is the protection of the Ego from the threats of external objects; he is haunted by his feeling of helplessness in relation to objective reality. He is always ready to retreat from the world, and if he has the feeling that his lines of communication are endangered his anxiety is aggravated. Hence he has a constant desire to maintain ascendancy over external objects, while seeking at the same time to escape into himself. There is thus in his psyche a permanent conflict which may show itself in rapid oscillations of the libido, and hence indecision and changeability, or else in a paralysis of will or *aboulia* which effectively brings life to a standstill.

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When the actual psychic constitution of the individual is of poor quality and low resistance, such conflict can produce a dissociation. Then the individual loses contact with reality; infantile modes of reaction reassert themselves: phantasies pass for reality, and a psychosis ensues.

It may be inferred from all this that Jung's therapeutic technique differs widely from Freud's. Apart from the fact that mythological exposition is part of the analyst's function, it is to be noted that no special interest is displayed in infantile fixations of the libido. Theoretically, the first stage in analysing a dream is to exhaust the associations in the personal unconscious. Later, the deeper meaning of the dream is studied in all the ramifications of its symbolic content in the racial unconscious, i.e. in its mythological aspect. It is always assumed, that the unconscious activity of the patient is directed towards the same problem as his conscious activity, and that it contains at least the elements of a solution. The task of the analyst is to help the patient to make a successful adaptation to reality. In doing so he does not dictate a solution but endeavours to

translate the archaic imagery of the dream into its ideational significance both reductive and prospective. Naturally it is to the latter that Jung attaches real therapeutic value. He regards the reductive side of analysis—which is, of course, the only aspect that Freud deals with—as doing little more than bring into consciousness the illicit wish tendencies. The synthetic part of the work remains to be done. Whereas Freud ends the analysis by dissolving the transference of infantile phantasy on to the analyst, Jung claims that this is merely the end of the first part of analysis—namely the investigation of the personal unconscious, and that the study of the racial unconscious has still to be undertaken. He maintains that if this is not done, the libido, freed in the dissolution of the transference, “sinks down into the depths of the unconscious, revivifying what has been dormant there for immemorial ages.” The further analysis implies a transference relation also, but in this the projection of new phantasy formations is of a different nature. The analyst, instead of being father, mother or other object of personal libidinous fixation, becomes the god, the

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devil, or some archaic image belonging to the history of the race. It is very clear that if Jung's claims are valid the demands made on the analyst, in skill, perception, erudition and judgment, are very much greater than those made on the Freudian analyst. In this connection Mitchell remarks: "The emphasis laid by Jung on the importance of his constructive method may prove a real danger to the rising generation of analysts. They may be tempted to neglect the need for the thorough analysis which Jung himself admits to be necessary, and to embark too precipitately on the constructive course which they may find ethically and æsthetically more attractive."



## CHAPTER IV

### POINTS OF CONTRAST BETWEEN PSYCHO- ANALYSIS AND ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY

IN previous chapters a number of points have been raised over which Jung and Freud are at variance. The differences between the two systems are, in fact, so fundamental that further consideration of them is called for.

The complete irreconcilability—for the differences amount to no less—of the two systems is as fundamental as the differences in human nature. It would be possible to divide mankind into two groups. The first group welcome the conception of strict causality, for through it they can realize that they have been in the past neither fools nor sinners, but merely victims of their environment. The Freudian emancipation partakes of the nature of an absolution. It has brought peace to many unhappy sufferers, and it will do so

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in the future to very many more. But this form of emancipation—being based upon logic—has a logical implication for the future. That implication is that the individual will have no more freedom in the future than he had in the past, that choice is but an illusion, that purpose consists merely of the strivings of his libido to find expression. There are and always will be many who will be ready to pay this price for the emancipation Freudian methods secure for them.

On the other hand, there will be to the end of time the opposite group, those who value power, independence, adventure, freedom. They will be prepared to face their past lives and accept full responsibility for guilt and folly, provided that they can be assured that by developing their personality and extending their consciousness, they may realize themselves in the future better than they have done in the past. They must hold on to freedom, as no illusion but as the greatest of human attributes; they must feel that their ideals are, as they believe them to be, their own; they must be assured that the spirit of adventure is something more than com-

pensatory super-ego compulsion. This group will always be resistant to any Faustian contract, while the first group will readily renounce any such folly as "walking on the water" if they can feel freedom from guilt, coupled perhaps with the edifying sense of partaking in a mystery.

It is to be noted that many religious systems have attempted to deal with the sense of inferiority and guilt. Christianity has attempted a dual solution—redemption and power: "I can do all things. . . ." How far it has succeeded in combining the two features is irrelevant to our present discussion. What is relevant, however, is the question of types, racial and individual, that will be biased in one direction or the other. As was suggested in a previous chapter, there is great significance in the fact that Freud is a Jew and Jung a Teuton. To the Jew, with all his heritage of injustice and inferiority, any philosophy which exculpates will be acceptable. As Jung has pointed out, the Jew is generally an extravert, and a thinking one at that. For him, therefore, a system that is objective and logical must

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necessarily commend itself. He has never wished for any encouragement to do 'the irrational thing—least of all to "walk upon the water." Therefore the cold intellectualism of the Freudian system must necessarily commend itself to him.

In racial psychology the polar opposite of the Jew is the Teuton with all his power sense, his thrust and executive ability, to say nothing of his Hapsburg sense of superiority. It is vain to offer to this type any philosophy of life which precludes him from saying

"I am the master of my fate,  
I am the captain of my soul."

Furthermore, the introversion of the pure Teutonic type demands a system in which the subjective receives more emphasis than the objective; and this Jung's psychology provides.

How far these two temperamental types will ever agree or understand each other is a matter for speculation. Jung repeatedly asserts that the extravert cannot understand the introvert. This is no doubt true. But it is doubtful how far

the introvert, even if he does understand the extravert, can afford him positive help.

From all this it follows that the appeal made by any system is determined not by the facts, but by the inferences. How far either of these systems is indeed factual and how far inferential will not be settled in this generation, nor as long as there exists the uncompromising hostility of the rival factions. But judging from the analogies of politics and religion it seems probable that the individual bias which we have been discussing, will operate so persistently as to defeat any eclectic synthesis that may be attempted. The only thing certain is that the "facts of observation" claimed as such by each school are sufficiently contradictory to prove that someone must be wrong somewhere.

Perhaps the feature in Jung's system which more than any other will commend it to philosophers is the recognition of the creative principle. Jung certainly succeeds, where some would say that Freud fails, in giving a possible hypothesis of progress in human life. McDougall writes: "As hitherto formulated, the laws of the physical world are mechanistic, non-crea-

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tive; which means that the future course of events is wholly determined by the present and the present by the past. The activities of men, on the contrary, are purposive; they conform to teleological laws and are creative in the fullest sense." The conception of creative evolution is entirely reconcilable with Jung's scheme, whereas Freud, as was pointed out, leaves us with the impression of a closed circle—and no possibility of excelling the performance of the past.

Referring to dogma and belief Jung writes: "This function is exceedingly valuable from a biological point of view, for it gives rise to the incentives that force human beings to do creative work for the benefit of a future age, and, if necessary, to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the species. Thus the human being attains the same sense of unity and totality, the same confidence, the same capacity for self-sacrifice in his conscious existence that belongs unconsciously and instinctively to the wild animals." This passage indicates Jung's attitude towards the problem of social evolution, referring it to creative purpose in the individual. Similarly, æsthe-

tic creation is dealt with by Jung at length and, some will feel, adequately. "The personal orientation that is demanded by the problem of personal causality is out of place in the presence of the work of art, just because the work of art is not a human being, but essentially supra-personal. It is a thing and not a personality; hence the personal is no criterion for it. . . . Although a psychology with a purely biological orientation can with a certain measure of justification be applied to men, it can never be applied to the work of art, and still less to man as the creator. . . . The art work . . . is a creative reorganization of those very determinants to which a causalistic psychology must always reduce it. . . . The art work must be regarded as a creative formation, freely making use of every precondition. Its meaning and its own individual particularity rests in itself, and not in its preconditions."

Baynes accuses Freud of having erected "a psychological system upon a one-sided theory of psychic causality," and it is certain that many outside critics will feel that Jung's system, whatever may be its failings, is truer to life and experience, in

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the sense that it gives value to human personality rather than depreciating it. Nevertheless, what to the ordinary man seems true to life may not be borne out by actual evidence, and often is not. Rickman's reply to the taunt of "persistent and numbing depreciation of human personality" is that the Jungian method depreciates the particular personality under treatment in that "it divides attention between what the person brings with him and what the Jungian analyst sees or thinks he sees of God, of ultimate things, of the Collective Unconscious." Further on in the same article Rickman says: "Freud is not infallible, but without work by his method it will not be possible to *demonstrate* that Jung is right." And this, after all, is the very kernel of the dissension. Rickman is perfectly correct. If scientific demonstration is required, Jung's system stands a poor chance of enduring. And yet not even Freud has been able to demonstrate that the Moonlight Sonata is beautiful or that '81 port is good, to say nothing of a host of other values which we accept, and by which we order our lives.



Hart writes : " It is possible that the method of science will ultimately prove to be an imperfect weapon for the psychologist, and that some other approach will have to be used before any completely adequate understanding of mental phenomena can be attained. That is to say, the psychologist, when he has reached a certain point, may find further progress impossible unless he discards, not only mechanistic science, but the method of science itself. Such a position, indeed, has been frankly adopted by Jung, and this circumstance underlies the accusation of mysticism levelled at him by his scientific critics. This accusation is perhaps unfairly expressed, but they may reasonably charge him with being non-scientific." Yet another quotation is relevant. McDougall says : " There we have a truth of a different order from any of the truths of Science, a truth achieved by a process entirely different from any employed by the latter, and yet as indisputable as any Science can boast—and far more important. This truth, that what we call spiritual in man is the highest part of his nature, is reached by way of a judgment of value.

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Such judgments are intuitive ; unlike the hypotheses of Science, their affirmations cannot be tested, proved, or verified by any observation or experiment. They have no place in the processes of scientific discovery ; they belong to a different sphere ; and yet this particular judgment stands firmly established by the universal assent of mankind."

Turning from the central issue to minor points of divergence, we have to remark once more on the very different conceptions of the unconscious that emanate from the two schools. Biologists may be equally dissatisfied with either view, but it is presumable that anthropologists in general will lean more to Jung's teaching. Certainly Jung had announced his theory of phylogenesis in the unconscious some years before Freud followed him. And here the reader may recognize, perhaps with a sigh of relief, a vital psychological conception which must indeed be well founded since both schools are agreed upon it.

Repression, as we have seen, is very differently treated by the two schools. To Freud it is an incessant and dynamic function the intermission of which, even

for the shortest space of time, results in mental chaos. It is the active function of the censors. It has apparently selective capacity for repressing into the preconscious or the unconscious. Jung, on the other hand, appears to regard the personal unconscious as relatively unimportant, whereas the racial unconscious is of primary import. The emergence of unconscious material in consciousness is much more a process for the conscious to develop, than one in which the conscious has ever to defend its own peace. Jung talks of the withdrawal of the libido from the object into the subject, but this process does not seem to come under the heading of repression. In any case the origin of the neuroses is not in conflict so much as in maladaptation, and therefore the question of repression is hardly emphasized at all, in contrast to the great stress thrown on it by the Freudians, particularly in earlier phases of psycho-analytic development.

Jung accepts Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex as a universal experience. But he regards it as being either a simple possession complex or as a desire for re-birth. In the former case the mother is regarded

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equally by boy or girl as a source of satisfaction and gratification. The father is merely in the way and equally so for both boy and girl. When the erotic element enters, it is regarded as an archaic expression indicating the desire or necessity for re-birth.

“The course of the invincible sun has supplied the mystery of human life with beautiful and imperishable symbols; it became a comforting fulfilment of all the yearning for immortality, of all desire of mortals for eternal life. Man leaves the mother, the source of libido, and is driven by the eternal thirst to find her again, and to drink renewal from her; thus he completes his cycle, and returns again into the mother’s womb.” In commenting on this passage Mitchell says: “It is by thus laying bare the mythological foundation of the infantile incest phantasy that Jung seeks to break away from the Freudian interpretation and to regard the phantasy not as a true sexual inclination towards the parents” but as “a regressive product of the revival of the archaic modes of function, outweighing actuality.”

We have seen that introversion is one

of Jung's cardinal formulations. Freud says: "The return of the libido on to phantasy is an intermediate step on the way to symptom-formation which well deserves a special designation. C.G. Jung has coined for it the very appropriate name of introversion, but inappropriately he uses it also to describe other things. We will adhere to the position, etc., etc." The Freudian school has been notoriously jealous of any of the terms coined by Freud being used in any but the exact connotations he gives them. It seems hardly fair, therefore, that the Freudians should take over a term Jung has coined and proceed to restrict its connotation. Be that as it may, it is certain that to the average reader the term "introversion," if it means anything, stands for Jung's conception of an inward direction of the stream of libido.

A point of very real difference between the two schools lies in the conception of intuition. Whereas to Jung this is one of the most valuable and important functions of the psyché, Freud has very little to say about it. Most psychologists, however, will assuredly lean to Jung's view, even though they may not accept it *in toto*.

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Certainly the phenomenon of reaching conclusions without being consciously aware of the steps by which the conclusion is reached, is sufficiently familiar to merit discussion. But so far Freud seems very uncertain about unconscious reasoning.

When we turn to type-psychology, we find that Jung has a great deal to say, basing his classification on inherited characteristics. Freud, on the other hand, has developed a type-psychology attributable not to heredity but to emotional development in infancy. Prinzhorn, writing of "the older psycho-analysis," uses these words: "whose extensive and pleasantly stimulating application depended on the fact that even the most miserable weakling could flatter himself that, with Goethe too, the same instincts would have played the same decisive rôle as with him, but that some practical joke of Destiny had permitted Goethe to find in poetry a pleasanter sublimation of his sexuality." It seems probable that ultimately we shall have to accept both categories—not necessarily as they stand now, but in the sense that outstanding and persistent behaviour trends are to be traced some to heredity

and some to early experience. The average reader will probably recognize with greater facility the more important of Jung's psychological types than Freud's grouping, but that is not a reason for discarding the latter. The study that is called for now is the real inter-relationship of the two groups, but so long as the warring factions continue to ignore each other's contribution no great advance can be looked for. It would, however, be of the utmost value to trace in a given individual a certain primary characteristic, say an obsessional tendency, to study from the genetic point of view its hereditary source, if any; to evaluate the factor of imitation or mental contagion; to investigate infantile experience (*a*) by psycho-analysis, and (*b*) by collecting external evidence. This investigation would, no doubt, be directed to the way in which the patient had reacted as an infant to the discipline of sphincter control. From such a combined study it might conceivably, be demonstrated that the infant with an inherited obsessional trend is the one who reacts worst to this particular difficulty of infancy, and that an obsessional personality is not neces-

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sarily to be thought of as *merely* an introverted thinking type, nor yet as *merely* an "anal character." It is clear enough that in the present state of affairs, the two schools, will continue to study personality with ever-increasing elaboration, and in so doing will diverge further and further from any common ground. Any sort of reconciliation and co-ordination will have to come from without and be carried out by those who are sufficiently informed and sufficiently broadminded to take cognizance of both hereditary and experiential sources of personality.

On the subject of transference Jung and Freud have little in common. To recapitulate the Freudian use of the transference the following passage by Rickman is helpful: "Every action of the patient in the phase of transference represents to the Freudian a repetition in action of an impulse once experienced psychically. It is the analyst's task to bring this to the patient's attention and get him to recollect the earlier psychical experience, in other words, something in the past has to be found to *match* the present experience. It follows from this that the less the analyst



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shows himself or his personality, the more he is a blank screen on which the patient may project his phantasies, the more exact will be the reproduction of the old experience. It will also be noted that the analyst has to do no more than detect and match two things produced, a new mental experience (centring on himself) and an old one (centring on some person in the patient's past). His self-effacement has to be as complete as possible in order that the patient's own characteristics may be thrown out in the strongest light." (It is not irrelevant to remind the reader at this point of Freud's own dictum that "Analytic therapy . . . employs suggestion to change the outcome of these conflicts.") Jung's use of the transference is much more nebulous. He attributes transference phantasies in the first place to a projection of the personal unconscious based upon personal memories. Subsequently the collective unconscious emerges and phantasies are expressed in which the analyst appears as god, demon or even animal. He believes that the predominatingly sexual character of a Freudian transference is attributable to the

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analyst's exclusive concentration on, the sexual aspect.

In concluding this comparison between the two schools reference may be made to their respective attitudes towards idealism, morality and religion. Freud has stated his views on religion in *The Future of an Illusion*. This is a very interesting piece of work, but it appears to refer exclusively to the formal, behaviouristic and traditional elements in any religion, and completely ignores the higher elements such as disinterested altruism, creative vision, personal idealism, and intuitive valuations. In this essay Freud reduces religion, as he sees it or knows it, to the demand of social morality for instinctual renunciation on the part of the individual, and the reduction of this conflict to terms of the Oedipus situation. Jung's view of religion is very much wider. Much of it he reduces to the expression of the collective unconscious and in that sense a phylogenetic recognition of human helplessness in the face of the unexplainable. But he gives to altruism a very definite place among the factors in social evolution. Mitchell has said : " Freud's outlook may be compared

to that of Adam before the Fall—the pursuit of pleasure in a paradise of desire, marred only by the interdict placed upon the fruit of the forbidden tree. Jung's outlook is rather that of Adam after the expulsion from the garden, confronted with the task of adaptation if he would live." This appears to be a perfectly just simile. To Freud there are but two goals in life—libidinal satisfaction and a return to the inanimate. Jung, on the other hand, seems to see in human behaviour a manifold purpose which embraces realization of individual potentialities, mastery over circumstance and progressive evolution of the race.

## CHAPTER V

### INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY (ADLER)

(1) *An Outline of the Theory.* From first to last Adler's system is human. Whatever inadequacies it may reveal from the scientific and philosophic angles, it constitutes a sort of pragmatic and optimistic gospel from which parents, teachers, physicians and politicians may all learn something. Adler claims to accept determinism, but in practice his system betrays few traces of the fatalism that permeates psycho-analysis.

Adler began as a disciple of Freud. He accepts in a very loose way the conception of the unconscious and repression, but instead of regarding sex as the central life-force he claims that Freud has "gloriously misinterpreted" the will to power. It is this which he regards as central. He pictures the individual as having to make three major adjustments in life : to society,

vocation and love. In making these adjustments he is helped or handicapped according to the experience of childhood and according to the way he has reacted to that experience. Adler very properly emphasizes the sense of helplessness with which every child begins life. That sense of helplessness can be exaggerated in two ways—first by unsuitable treatment and unfortunate environment; and second, by actual “organ inferiority.” Unsuitable treatment can be of many kinds, of course—snubbing, spoiling, sarcasm, over-solicitousness, favouritism, capriciousness, severity and so on. Any such form of unsuitable treatment makes the child more aware of its helplessness, and less confident of its ultimate development and adequacy.

Similarly, unfortunate environment can be of many kinds—the only child, the orphan, the “Joseph situation,” the fourth or fifth girl who is followed by the only son, the stepfather or stepmother situation, the posthumous child, and so on.

Adler describes as organ inferiorities any part or aspect of the body which in structure or function is or appears to be below average. This covers a very wide range

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of divergence from normal, and even includes normal cases in which the child has an impression that it is abnormal. Thus there are giants and dwarfs; there are myopics and deaf children; there are red-haired children and those with a streak of coloured blood; there are boys with abnormality of genital structure and children with infected glands. Indeed, there is hardly any peculiarity which is not capable of exaggerating the child's sense of helplessness and fear of ultimate failure.

Adler holds that whenever treatment, environment, or physical attribute emphasizes the natural sense of helplessness one of three responses must occur :

- (1) Successful compensation.
- (2) Defeat and some form of retreat.
- (3) Compromise or over-compensation—  
i.e. a neurotic reaction.

As examples of the first and successful response Adler quotes Beethoven who, being slightly deaf from childhood, became a great musician, and Demosthenes who did not rest till he had overcome his stammer enough to become one of the greatest orators in history. Of the second class examples are known to everyone.



It is noteworthy, however, that their failure of response is accepted by the world as the natural outcome of their affliction. The compromise type of reaction is also familiar enough in the individuals who project all their inadequacies on to physical limitations. The over-compensating response is much more common than is apt to appear. The little man who is unduly self-assertive is familiar enough; the weakling who shows exaggerated enthusiasm in following manly forms of sport; the plain-looking girl who affects brilliant colouring and *outré* clothes.

In all this Adler sees the child striving to feel adjusted or, we might better express it, to achieve valuation of his own personality. The adjustment can only be normal and successful if he makes the effort necessary to overcome his handicap, *and no more*. Hence the boy that is handicapped by a stepfather or a stammer—it matters not which—is called upon to make a greater effort, or at any rate to show greater courage, than the boy who is not so handicapped. But if his zeal overruns the requirements of the handicap, he becomes an over-compensated neurotic of

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some kind. Similarly, the girl who suffers from having several brothers and no sisters or who is afflicted by a cleft palate cannot achieve a normal valuation of her personality except by manifesting a more strenuous attitude to life than the normally situated child. "Every neurosis can be understood as an attempt to free oneself from a feeling of inferiority in order to gain a feeling of superiority." The reader will at once recognize in this broad formula three acute contrasts with Freud's theory. First, we have all the neuroses grouped together indiscriminately; secondly, we have the causative emphasis laid on inferiority rather than guilt; thirdly, the objective is power rather than expression of the libido. Without following this line of thought further at the moment, let us return to the three sources of difficulty for the child. In recognizing unsuitable treatment and unfortunate environment as responsible for many of the child's difficulties, Adler is laying stress on the environment rather than on the child's reaction. Therefore he studies this environment first, endeavouring to plot out the "family-style," as he calls it, in order to infer from

it the patient's "life-style." In other words, he attempts to evaluate the stresses and strains that have borne on the twig, so that he may deduce from them the direction in which the tree will be bent. He regards normal development as consisting in a perfect balance between ego-feeling and community-feeling. As the child's first ideas of community-feeling are necessarily family-feeling, it is obvious how important are the first attempts to balance the Ego and the family. The neurotic, however, fails in his attempt to balance the ego-feeling and community-feeling. This is because his "life-goal" is one of over-valuation of the Ego. Because of the childish difficulties already referred to, he lacks that sense of security which will allow him to accept a life-goal that is compatible with community demands; instead he chooses one of over-importance, or else he aims at escaping from comparison and criticism and takes shelter in some form of neurotic seclusion or protection. Thus he is always endeavouring to defend his self-esteem. As his life-goal implies such a high performance and as his fear for his self-esteem is so acute, it necessarily follows

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that the neurotic has a double attitude towards all opportunity. In the first place it offers a chance of the longed-for triumph, and at the same time it implies a risk of humiliating disaster. Therefore he spends his time in evading the opportunities he appears to desire, in making excuses for himself for not having seized them and in weaving phantasies to minister to his ego-feeling. It now becomes clear that in Individual Psychology the neurotic is an individual who has in childhood been exposed to unfair strains, and who has in consequence developed a morbid "life-style." In so far as this "life-style" demands constant evasions and protections for the Ego, it follows that advantage is continually being taken of any physical weakness or of any limitation in the environment. Hence any system or organ that is, or has been, unhealthy is likely to determine the seat or nature of the neurotic symptom. Adler, in his view of "organ inferiority," goes a long way in identifying organic and functional reaction. For instance, while he would regard a sore throat as an inflammatory process in the mucous membrane of the affected part, and would

doubtless allow that bacterial infection was playing a part, he would appear to regard every such case as conditioned by psychological factors or, in other words, serving some defensive purpose. The sore throat would not have occurred had not the patient been fearing some situation in the near future and therefore seeking an excuse for evasion. In practically all disease Adler sees three factors combining—the structural, the functional and the psychic. Instead of grouping diseases under one or other of these headings he regards them as always possessing the three elements. In neurotic symptoms the psychological factor is the major one but not the only one.

Adler insists that the individual is all the time facing his three challenges in life—society, vocation and love. He refuses to admit that any one of these three can be isolated and regarded as the sole problem of life. He points out that as the relationship between the Ego and the community begins in family life, so the first impressions of sex relations are gleaned by the child from the overt relations of his parents. The child who recognizes discord in that

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relationship will inevitably acquire a wrong "life-style" with regard to sex, and in adult life he is likely to evade, compromise or over-compensate rather than make a satisfactory adjustment. In this connection reference must be made to the mechanism which Adler describes as the "masculine protest." This mechanism appears in so many forms that one asks whether simplification might not have been effected by the use of two or more descriptive labels. The term is applied to the reaction of the boy who having been exposed to cruel treatment in boyhood responds by an excessive desire for power and becomes an overweening or even tyrannical husband and father. It is also applied to the spoiled weakling who entertains an equal admiration for masculinity but gratifies it by playing a feminine rôle in life, either in homosexuality or in relation to a wife. It is likewise applied to the girl who, on account of her experience of her parents, shrinks from the normal feminine rôle in life. In childhood she conceived it to be a rôle of subservience, drudgery, suffering or misery. She therefore attempts to meet the sexual demands of her organism in some

way that shall obviate the feared domination of a man. Adler emphasizes the urgent necessity of making children understand that the rôles of man and woman are different but equal.

In discussing the Adlerian view of sex behaviour, Wexberg says: "From the point of view of the personal goal, the biological, social and rational conations are causal, in much the same way that physical and chemical data are causal from the point of view of biological purposiveness." This modified determinism allows sex problems to be treated in a way which, relatively to Freud or Jung, is very simple. For instance, the function of the Oedipus complex is to exclude, "from the very beginning, all sex relations with women who might come into consideration for a genuine love relationship. The incest-complex is not suppressed but is *quite consciously* used to this end." There is here a contradiction in terms. A complex, in the Freudian and generally accepted meaning of the term, is a repressed system of ideas. It can no longer be regarded as a complex if it is in consciousness. It must be noted, however, that this is

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thoroughly characteristic of the totally divergent views of Adler and Freud. "The psycho-analysts investigate no further when they have discovered the 'source,' of homosexuality in an 'infantile libido fixation' because they have been taught that this is the real cause of the condition. Psycho-analysts are so blinded by their belief in the sexual cause of all mental maladjustments that they are incapable of seeing any other relationships. In truth, an aberration of sexual conduct can be interpreted only when we have discovered the non-sexual goals of personal conation." One of the principal sources of sex problems according to the Adlerian school rests with social and economic conditions. It is argued that the poor all grow up with a tendency to hedonistic over-compensation, that sex is regarded as the one "free" satisfaction, and that precocious and promiscuous sex activity is the natural response to all sorts of privations in early life. Similarly, great stress is laid on the appearance of "childhood patterns" in adult love. Thus an individual that has been betrayed in childhood, whether by parent or other adult, is certain



to be guarded in trusting a lover, and perhaps will never give himself or herself unreservedly. A girl who has been brought up on unconditional obedience becomes a masochistic wife who demands strict but tender domination by her husband. By this very subordination the wife makes the husband dependent on her or at least robs him of independence. Every modification of childish experience can be recapitulated in the attitude of the adult lover, for it was in the nursery that we had our first lessons in defending our self-esteem. We have followed this style ever since. In the love relationship our self-esteem is in greater jeopardy than in any other activity. Hence the childish pattern of our life-style will inevitably reveal itself most blatantly in love. Thus the passionate desire to be "all and everything" to the lover or mate reflects the illogical standards of life in the nursery, and the child's inability to moderate its emotional exclusivism. Flirtation is regarded as a defence against love—"a symptomatic expression of a 'fifty-fifty' style of life." Therefore the man who is given to flirting in love, flirts equally with business or society. He

spends his life trying to show that he *could* do a great deal; but in reality, he never comes to grips with any of his problems. Sexuality is the form given to love and the material out of which it is constructed, but not its essence. Happiness in the experience of another human being's love emanates from the great enhancement of self-esteem which is derived from the fact that one is valued so highly. When the lover begins to demand love in return for his love an insoluble problem arises, because the lover thereby becomes vulnerable. His self-esteem was up to that point relatively safe; now it is no longer so. A permanent and happy solution could only be achieved if the lover were entirely free from egoism, which is never the case. Striving to obtain complete possession of the beloved is the manifestation of fear and it always comes from the weaker partner. The inconsolability of the deserted lover is not due to undying love but to injured ego-feeling.

Adler attributes most of the characteristics which are sometimes described as "specifically feminine" to the universal

devaluation of women in society. Every little girl grows up with the idea that she is expected to be weak and that she will be valued for being as different as she can to the "manly man." Hence she plays the rôle of *naïveté*, of helplessness, of stupidity or any other negative rôle. She reconciles herself to this femininity under protest—"the masculine protest"—and uses "feminine weapons"—cunning, insincerity, treachery—to satisfy her will to power. Adler denies that these character traits are essentially feminine; he equates them with the reactions of the under-dog in any sphere of life. What social convention prizes, as well as all that it deplors, in the feminine make-up may thus be regarded as emanating from the subjection of the sex through countless ages.

The subject of masturbation is also approached from the social angle. It is harmful in so far as it creates a conflict, which conflict drives the masturbator to seek seclusion. Therefore energy and interest that should be expressed in group-feeling come to be utilized in a purely egoistic way. It is supposed that the practice invariably arises as a flight from

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defeat in some other sphere, and it is brought under the generalized formula that isolated conflicts within the personality never occur. Hence masturbation, like every other sexual difficulty, must be related to the whole "life-style" before an attempt is made to deal with it directly. In the same way homosexuality is regarded as an expression of a false "life-goal." Somewhat grudgingly it is admitted that a physiological factor may condition the symptom in certain cases. The female homosexual who adopts the masculine rôle is regarded as showing courage in her masculine protest, while the womanish homosexual man is supposed to be the product of "profound discouragement" in early years. In general, homosexual tendencies are regarded as a defence against the dangers to self-esteem involved in normal heterosexual attachments.

Adler attributes the central urge to marriage and procreation on the part of the woman to innate mother-love, and on the part of the man to a vague but profound desire to defeat mortality in so far as this can be done by giving his name to

children. The self-esteem of the male finds no greater challenge than death ; the self-esteem of the female finds an equally clamant challenge in sterility. The man's most obvious and usual reaction is to have a family, so that he may not be entirely forgotten by his social group. In this way he seeks to balance the ego-feeling against the prospect of dissolution. Apparently this way out is hardly recognizable in the woman. Her self-esteem is enhanced by the bearing of a child without regard to social reaction either immediate or remote. Children are regarded as stimulating most fathers to greater industry and resourcefulness, and in this way as constituting less of an economic burden than is usually supposed. The childless marriage is interpreted as an expression of a futile attempt to rectify pessimism by hedonism. The purposively childless couple may say that it is a sin to bring children into such a world of suffering, but in reality they are afraid of the responsibility of a family and imagine that their married life will be an uninterrupted honeymoon if they evade parenthood. This then is another manifestation of an egoistic style of life.

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Asceticism is subjected to similar analysis.<sup>o</sup> "In the ascetic life," writes Wexberg, "we falsely premise another 'I' against which we must fight or be conquered. The ascetic wants a make-believe triumph. . . . This tilting against the windmills of one's own fancy usually makes its highest appeal to those individuals who do not trust themselves to strive for the more modest successes of reality."

Crookshank says: "The true solution of the sexual problem, as between men and women, is in that official or unofficial monogamy which constitutes a constructive task for two persons who are determined to live together in order to relieve and to enrich each other's lives." In short, co-operation is the great lesson that should be taught in every true system of education, and by it alone can we hope to see real adjustment achieved in social, sexual and political spheres. Adler points out that the "masculine protest" is not only the most frequent mechanism whereby neuroses in women develop, but also a very usual cause of maladjustment in society and politics. He has much to say on the relation of feminist political movements

to this mechanism. Furthermore, he discusses at considerable length the problem of prostitution and attributes it—perhaps not without justice—to the masculine protest. He regards the prostitute as the woman who satisfies her envy of the male by exploiting him. There can be no doubt that this rather comprehensive concept of the masculine protest has a great number of legitimate and fruitful applications, not merely in functional nervous disorder but in marital, social and even criminal problems.

In the long-lasting problem of Nature versus Nurture, Adler throws his weight very much to the side of Nurture. "In the individual life the formation of character is far more significant than is the material given at birth." In considering this sentence it is not inappropriate to recall the great contrast between the formative processes as described by Freud and those emphasized by Adler. "Congenital temperament or temperament modified by physical factors, follows the laws of biological purposiveness. When temperament is reconstellated into the individual's personal pattern and made

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appropriate to his personal goal in life ; . . . it is largely modified and redirected towards its new purpose by the central personality. This is the origin of character." In spite of this, most Adlerians use the working hypothesis that nothing is hereditary and everything acquired.

As a therapeutic system Adler's teaching differs as completely as possible from psycho-analysis. The Adlerian physician's first function is to encourage. He has to investigate the "family-style" and explain to his patient how this has contributed to the individual "life-style." He has to indicate the "life-goal" and make the patient recognize its exaggerated character. He has to show the patient the subterfuges whereby he is evading the challenges of life and the fictions which he is mentally substituting for reality. Adler recognizes in his work two main groups of resisters. The first are the neurotics, who are difficult from the very nature of their trouble ; they fear the criticism, the condemnation or the domination of the physician. The other group is that of complacent and successful adults, who have attained their ambitions without needing to come to real adjust-



ment between the Ego and the community. In all treatment Adler insists on an attitude of "benevolent comradeship" being maintained by the physician. Furthermore, there is no embargo on physical remedies being used as is the case in psycho-analysis. At the same time it would appear that in actual practice a good many Adlerians tend, in their emphasis on psycho-genesis, to underestimate somatic factors. It is true that different physical symptoms such as sickness, indigestion, constipation, asthma are said to be associated with specific forms of maladjustment, nevertheless there was perhaps some justification in the taunt that if Adler were called to a case of ptomaine poisoning he would suspect the patient of marital infidelity or embezzlement. Hart says: "Adler finds that the psychoses can be interpreted as manifestations of the will to power, and, although his views are clearly unduly simplistic, it can be conceded that they do cast considerable light on at any rate some of the phenomena with which they are concerned."

Crookshank's defence of Adler on this allegation is as follows: "The reproach

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is constantly made that Individual Psychology is too simple, is superficial, is 'the psychology of common sense, the psychology of the man, woman, and child in the street. We reply: Yes, but the simplest explanations are often the most profoundly based, and the intuitive wisdom of the child and of the 'pure in heart' anticipates the final conclusions of the truest philosophers. By the 'pure in heart' is meant, in this connection, those whose vision is not distorted by sophistical and conventional intellectual constructions: the real Fall of Man dates from the substitution of these constructions, for the simple intuitions common to all mankind."

Adler takes some notice of dreams, but only in a very superficial and—in comparison with Freudian methods—perfunctory way. A few stock symbols are interpreted and the general "cartoon" value of the manifest content is interpreted to the patient. Freud, in commenting on Adler's use of the dream, says: "The statement that all dreams are to be interpreted bisexually, as a combination of two tendencies which may be called male and female (A. Adler) will seem to you

quite incomprehensible. Here again, single dreams of this sort do of course occur and later on you may learn that their structure is similar to that of certain hysterical symptoms."

No attempt is made to establish a transference in anything like the Freudian sense, but it is abundantly obvious to outside observers that Adlerian physicians are by no means immune from those affective attachments which occur whenever neurotic dissatisfaction encounters professional sympathy.

The philosophy at the back of Adler's system is not very easy to understand. In the first place he claims to accept Freud's fundamental thesis of psychological determinism. But his practice, as must be clear from what has been said, assumes at every point the freedom of the individual and his responsibility for his condition. "We may acquit the neurotic of guilt, and may recognize the objectively necessary course of the neurosis as of all natural phenomena, but the patient himself is not entitled to do so." This is very different from Freud's "thorough-going determinism." In the second place Adler claims

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that every psychological reaction (and therefore every physical symptom) has to be interpreted as if it subserved an end. This seeming paradox will leave some readers dissatisfied. Actually Adler would appear to be a pragmatist. To him the pursuit of knowledge is as vain as it is supreme with Freud. Adler is concerned solely with the practical business of living : Freud is no less exclusively taken up with truth for its own sake.

(2) *Some Extracts from Adler's Writings.* The following extracts from Adler's own pen may serve to confirm the preceding sketch of his system.

"In 1906 . . . I . . . launched on the momentous departure of repudiating the sexual ætiology of mental phenomena as fallacious. In a vague way I saw even then that the impulsive life of man suffers variations and contortions, curtailments and exaggerations *relative to the kind and degree of its aggressive power*. In accordance with the present outlook of individual psychology, I should rather say : *relative to the way the power of co-operation has developed in childhood.*"

"Children born with hereditary organic

weaknesses exhibit not only a physical necessity to compensate for the defect, and tend to over-compensate, but the entire nervous system, too, may take part in this compensation; especially the mind, as a factor of life, may suffer a striking exaggeration in the direction of the defective function (breathing, eating, seeing, hearing, talking, moving, feeling or even thinking), so that this over-emphasized function may become the mainspring of life, in so far as a 'successful compensation' occurs."

"My conviction that the doctrine of congenital mental traits was erroneous helped me considerably. I came to realize that characters were guiding threads, *ready attitudes* for the solution of the problems of life . . . *all psychical phenomena originate in the particular creative force of the individual, and are expressions of his personality.*"

"Children may be artificially placed in the same straits as if their organs were defective. If we make their work in very early life so hard that even their relatively normal organs are not equal to it, then they are in the same distress as those with defective physique. . . . Thus I found two further categories of children who are apt

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to develop an abnormal sense of inferiority  
—*pampered children and hated children.*”

“I tried to prove that upon deeper inspection there appears no contrast between the conscious and unconscious, that both co-operate for a higher purpose, that our thoughts and feelings become conscious as soon as we are faced with a difficulty, and unconscious as soon as our personality-value requires it. At the same time I tried to set forth the fact that that which other authors had used for their explanations under the name of *conflict*, *sense of guilt*, *ambivalence* was to be regarded as symptomatic of a hesitant attitude, for the purpose of evading the solution of one of the problems of life.”

“From the sense of female inferiority, which most people, men and women alike, possess, both sexes have derived an overstrained desire for masculinity, a superiority complex which is often extremely harmful, a will to conquer all difficulties of life in the masculine fashion, which I have called the *masculine protest*.”

“The *striving for superiority* runs parallel to physical growth. It is an intrinsic necessity of life itself. It lies at the root

of all solutions of life's problems, and is manifested in the way in which we meet these problems. All our functions follow its direction; rightly or wrongly they strive for conquest, surety, increase. The impetus from minus to plus is never ending. . . . Whatever premises all our philosophers and psychologists dream of—self-preservation, pleasure principle, equalization—all these are but vague representations, attempts to express the great upward drive."

"I recognized a further premise . . . one which agreed with the formulations of older philosophers, but conflicted with the standpoint of modern psychology: *the unity of the personality*."

"Early in life, in the first four or five years, a *goal* is set for the need and drive of psychical development, a goal towards which all its currents flow. . . . Thus the individual mitigates its sense of weakness in the anticipation of redemption. Here again we see the meaninglessness of congenital psychic traits . . . whoever would draw conclusions from them is making matters too simple."

"Individual psychology . . . insisted

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absolutely on the indispensability of *finalism* for the understanding of all psychological phenomena. No longer could causes, powers, instincts, impulses, and the like serve as explanatory principles, but the final goal alone."

"In all human failure . . . in crime . . . in fact in all nervous symptoms, we may read lack of the proper degree of *social feeling*."

"The style of life is what makes our experiences reasons for our attitude . . . no amount of bitter experience can change his style of life, *as long as he has not gained understanding*. The whole work of education, cure, and human progress can be furthered along lines of better comprehension."

"Individual psychology considers the essence of therapy to lie in making the patient aware of his lack of co-operative power, and to convince him of the origin of this lack in early childhood maladjustments. . . . His power of co-operation is enhanced by collaboration with the doctor. His 'inferiority complex' is revealed as erroneous. Courage and optimism are awakened. And the 'meaning of life' "



dawns upon him as the fact that proper meaning must be given to life."

"What do we find in our life when we enter this world? The answer is: The contributions of our ancestors . . . we find it in works, children, ideas, traditions, Art. . . . Therefore if we are looking for the meaning of life, we find it in the first place in the fact of contribution."

"The first person for this co-operation is the mother . . . we see the importance of the father in the same way and so, slowly growing, the social interest of the child from co-operation with the father and the mother to co-operation with other children, and we have the family."

"What do we call characteristics? These are social relations. . . . You cannot find one characteristic which does not mean a social relation which can be measured."

"Human beings strive for the *happiness* of others; this is the true pleasure of the socially interested person. The 'pleasure principle' is the striving of a person who is only interested in himself and not in others."

"Whence comes this ability of co-

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operation? Is it an inherited instinct? Is it inborn? *That* is not possible' because . . . they always involve social relations which do not exist before the child is born. . . . Therefore it cannot be an inherited *entity*. That there must be an inherited ability we cannot question."

"Such an explanation as this of to-day means putting back education on its right throne again, against all other views, against the views of heredity and environment."

## CHAPTER VI

### THE WORK OF PRINZHORN

It would be incorrect to regard the work of Hans Prinzhorn as a derivative of psycho-analysis. His work is based upon "the world-picture of Goethe," the philosophy of Nietzsche and the characterology of Klages. Nevertheless, Prinzhorn has so much to say about psycho-analysis, and accords to Freud so important a position that it seems appropriate to give an outline of his views. The first English translation of his work entitled *Psychotherapy* appeared in 1932. Translations of some of his earlier volumes are in course of preparation.

Prinzhorn's attitude to psychotherapy is not unlike James's attitude to psychology as quoted in the introduction to the present volume. He believes psychotherapy to be woefully misunderstood and industriously misused. The four cardinal misconcep-

tions of current psychotherapy he formulates as follows :

(1) That a purely scientific basis can be found for psychotherapy.

(2) That so far as this basis is lacking psychotherapy is an affair of the churches or of quacks.

(3) That psychotherapy can be taught like any medical method, personal aptitude having no part to play.

(4) That social adaptation is the crown of psychotherapy ; whereas, in truth, psychotherapy is personal guidance.

From these fundamental criticisms we can at once infer that Prinzhorn takes a very broad view of the needs of the neurotic and the functions of the psychotherapist. We need not therefore experience surprise when we find him advocating the practice of psychotherapy by the laity. "In this case, as in all Art, every one may practise who can. . . . He who can achieve most, justly counts for most." His interest is that psychotherapy as a highly developed speciality should be practised by the few, whether medical or lay, who have the gift and who have equipped themselves. But his greater interest is that the need for

psychotherapy should be reduced. He sees no prospect of this coming about on any considerable scale until humanity itself is changed. But meantime both patients and doctors could contribute something. If the patients were better educated, in the true sense of the word, there would be less psychotherapy to be done; and if all doctors understood such basic and essential concepts as psychosomatic unity and social adaptation there would be less need for physical and symptomatic treatment.

In studying Prinzhorn it is essential to accept certain difficulties of thought and expression. The translation of *Psychotherapy* has been conscientiously carried out by Arnold Eiloart, but like many other psychological works that have been originally written in German, the text abounds with involved periods and with words to which a rather unusual connotation is attached. Thus we find biology used in the sense of social biology in a slightly disconcerting way. An example is afforded by the following passage which is otherwise of fundamental importance. "Psychotherapy is never concerned with

the individual alone, but always at the same time with his relation to the community as a biological circumstance." It is manifest from this passage that Prinzhorn leans to Adler's social attitude rather than to Freud's more individual outlook; nevertheless, he appraises the work of the latter much higher than that of Adler. "Since about 1900 the central problem of psychotherapy has been Freud. . . . Freud belongs to the few investigator-thinkers who have added to our mental world something imperishable and inalterable." "For a long time Freud and his disciples talked quite naïvely of the pleasure experienced in listening to music, or in looking at pictures or the drama, as 'nothing but sublimated sexuality.' Fortunately the fifty-years-old man remained accessible to new experiences, to self-development and to the refinement of the abstractions which were his tools. Thus . . . he attained at once deeper insight into life as a whole, and that reverence for the secret of actuality whereby his later works are so favourably distinguished from his first doctrinaire teaching, with its daring grasp and smooth construction."

"If . . . an adult independent human being comes to us as one needing help, and if for good reasons we consider him to be one who has neurotically come to a standstill . . . what . . . is the first thing to be recognized? Surely that *all facts of a scientific degree of exactitude are here worthless*: every statement to the contrary falsifies the facts. . . . We must bear in mind the high diagnostic value of the Freudian method, as well as the value . . . of his constructive teaching; at the same time we must insist on the urgent necessity for at least *two supplementary points of view, which psycho-analytic tradition is very slow to admit: first a characterology* which is more interested in the actual contents of a personality . . . than in interpreting the events that have happened to it . . . and *secondly, a doctrine of life* . . . which seeks to comprehend the whole of life as a unity . . . and not referred to a single function, sex."

"The permanently valuable discoveries of Freud need . . . incorporation in a psychology which shall do justice to the phenomena, *without forcing them into the strait waistcoat of an ephemeral sys-*

*tem, by too rashly fitting new words to old facts."*

"We must not forget that the . . . analyst is not sitting there simply as the neutral receiver of reports and confessions, dreams and ideas, but must interpret, and also estimate, whether he will or not. . . . *His efficacy consists in the fact that he grants absolution*, and, above all, his power over the minds of his patients . . . consists, to a very considerable extent, in this power borrowed from the priest."

"To say that Freud discovered 'the unconscious' is a distortion; historically the statement is incorrect. Freud has indicated ways to investigate unconscious mental processes, which, in fact, with some limitations, are practicable. But he set up an early theory 'of the unconscious' which was fundamentally untenable, because it introduced into the primeval mental processes a naïve over-rationalization. Then, later, he set up a second theory which he attempted to reconcile with the already existing deeper doctrines as to the unconscious nature of mental processes, without arriving at a satisfactory solution. Many of Freud's observa-



tions are of great importance, and the stimulating power of most of his inquiries is profound ; but all attempts to represent the whole actuality of life, by means of a fundamentally false ' Theory of the unconscious,' must remain hopeless."

" There lies at the basis of every analytical mode of thought Nietzsche's recognition of the fundamental and systematic self-deception from which the modern man especially must build up his conscious picture of himself."

" There is no truth in the dogma that a ' pure method,' even with a sound theoretical basis, is worth more than living achievement."

" All that is lacking is . . . power of intuition in the investigators—one of those patrimonies to which one attains only by heredity. Who will wonder then if crude persons deny what fate has denied to them . . . or exclude from recognition those who possess it, by means of . . . a conspiracy of silence ? "

It will thus be seen how Prinzhorn incorporates the scientific Freudian factors in a broad system that completely transcends the limits of science.

"The essential function of psychotherapy is the same as that of every religious community. . . . Its only concern is that the sufferer shall find a form of security for life." Psychotherapy is concerned with neurosis, psychosis and, as a special but frequent case, potential suicide. We may regard the neurotic as the individual who has brought life to a standstill; the psychotic as one who has retreated from life, and the suicide as one who has discarded life. Hence the formula of "finding a form of security for life" has great pertinence and wide applicability. But this is far removed from the Freudian conception of a scientific and objective study of the mind. It is therefore logical that Prinzhorn should lay down that "all psychotherapeutic . . . leadership must seek the sustaining mean between rational regulation and the devotion that redeems the lost." But he goes much further than this. The psychotherapist, as mediator, guides his patient from the isolation that is full of fear to "wholeness of life, to new comradeship, to the world, perhaps to God. Without this form of the erotic no psychotherapeutic

curative action is possible." This interpretation of the relation of psychotherapist to patient is quite irreconcilable with Freud's view of the part played by the analyst in the transference.

The stress which Prinzhorn lays upon the inherited or temperamental factor, prevents him from indulging in any easy optimism as to results of treatment. Indeed, he is almost pessimistic. In addition to temperamental obstacles he sees three others :

(1) The difficulty of making necessary transformations in the patient's environment.

(2) The natural tendency of the psychotherapist to embark upon the treatment of cases that prove much less responsive than he had at first imagined.

(3) The weakness of "therapeutic work" as compared to the effectiveness of love and religious experience.

In connection with the second of these points Prinzhorn writes : "Remarkably rare among present-day physicians are those who possess a natural capacity to distinguish, and to sense, psychotherapeutically accessible patients, and who can

judge of the chances, the best method, the suitable personality, the probable duration of a course of mental treatment; above all, who know that this treatment can be prescribed, not on the basis of the somatic diagnosis, but only if they feel that the personality of the patient is adapted or open to such a task, and if moreover a therapist is to be found to whom he appeals; to say nothing of minor details!" The Freudian conception of a neutral analyst is repeatedly condemned. "It is simply not true that one can discuss with a neurotic, even for a single hour, his quite ordinary troubles (headache, sleeplessness) without the personal view of the world being revealed and urged, in estimates and even in questions; this begins, so to say, immediately behind the roughest registration of manifest symptoms and a prescription of purely symptomatic therapy. . . . However agile the . . . talent with which the therapist folds the mantle of objectivity into ever new forms, it avails him nothing, what *acts* is the law of his own life . . . his personal *ethos*." And again: "The therapist is the representative of the supreme law;—in the religious

sense, the *mediator*. This is the reason why his person, his character, his view of the universe, his ethic, play such an immensely important part in the treatment; and why every attempt to spread a belief in the objectivity, the impartiality, the impersonality, of psycho-analytic method must to-day be described as conscious misleading of the public."

Prinzhorn's half-humorous, half-serious prescription for the compounding of the ideal psychotherapist is as follows: "One wise priest from each of the great religious communities, one lawyer, one teacher, one psychologist, one wise philosopher, and three physicians possessing a very firm biological basis."

Prinzhorn insists that in all psychotherapy we must "keep a view of the universe as an aim." He maintains that the most essential feature of psychoanalysis is neither its psychological theory nor its therapeutic technique, but its "consequences regarding the view of the universe." And in this contention he is probably correct. "The violent antagonism of many psychiatrists and psychologists . . . is often to be explained simply

enough by their antipathy to the obliteration of values; for such obliteration may be taken as sacrilege against culture and against humanity, and must then naturally lead to . . . full rejection of psycho-analysis." In another passage Prinzhorn refers to "the one-sided tendency of the Freudians to level all values in the face of instinct." This is perhaps as succinct and basic as any criticism of psycho-analysis.

Prinzhorn maintains that a true psychotherapeutic method must comprise curative factors of three orders—suggestive, training (i.e. re-educative) and erotic. In so far as a system repudiates one or more of these factors it is either sterile or its exponents are self-deceived. The ultimate function of every method is to create "for the cramped inhibited lonely human being in his perplexity, such security, certainty and union with his environment, as shall provide a sort of substitute for the full biological security that he has lost."

There can be little doubt that Prinzhorn has elaborated a most impressive view of neurotic need and psychotherapeutic function. He has broken away from conventional attitudes both psychological and

philosophical, and he offers a synthesis of biology, psychology and religion which commands respectful consideration. In this synthesis he emphasizes the spiritual isolation of the neurotic, the essential place of human mediation and support, the function of the psychotherapist as guide, the importance of temperament in the patient and of intuition in the psychotherapist, the limitations of the objective study of personality, the central necessity of valuation for all adjustment, the inadequacy of an instinct psychology and the effective function of the psychotherapist's personal *ethos*.

## CHAPTER VII

### CONCLUDING COMPARISON

IF we attempt to appraise the relative merits of these systems of psychology we may safely begin by saying that Freud's is the most intricate, Jung's the most profound, Adler's the most practical and Prinzhorn's the broadest. Adler's system will always be useful and popular and is therefore bound to extend its vogue. It is the one that offers the least challenge to man's innate narcissism. Freud will always be popular with a limited section of mankind because of the objective approach which evades subjective difficulties. It will attract, as it always has done, extraverts, Jews and purely rational types. Jung's system will never appeal to more than a very limited group, partly because of its complexity and partly because it has never spread except from personal contact with Jung himself. It



will appeal to a few introverts, Teutons and mystics. Prinzhorn's system is bound to make a strong appeal to philosophical minds of all types, for they will find in it basic principles that correspond to the intuitive needs of mankind and a ruthless unmasking of the partiality of other systems. Neither Jung nor Prinzhorn can be expected to make a special appeal to the medical profession; Adler and Freud will no doubt continue to divide interest from that quarter, despite the fact that each of them has, in his own way, failed to give due prominence to somatic ætiology. Adler's system will always be the safest, if for no other reason than that it is the most superficial. Nevertheless, psycho-analysis itself has an inherent factor of safety which must not be overlooked: the institutional, one might almost say liturgical, qualities of the system; the inelastic concepts; the pervading, if illusory, objectivity of the technique; the strict training of the psycho-analyst, comparable to the training of Roman Catholic priests; and, finally, the repetitive and even mediocre qualities which constitute the personal endowment of many psycho-analysts—all

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these points make for a certain element of safety. On the other hand, Jung, and still more Prinzhorn, leave in the hands of the psychotherapist much greater freedom of action, and interpretation and thereby sacrifice a certain element of safety. Indeed, Prinzhorn's conception of the psychotherapist's function is such as to leave us wondering whether the human race is capable of producing worthy exponents of such a lofty mission, except in minimal numbers or even as infrequent prodigies. Theoretically, Prinzhorn's picture of a messianic psychotherapist may be valid, but it is quite clear that in practice Freud's "mantle of objectivity" serves to cover a multitude of personal inadequacies on the part of the analyst, as it is calculated to save him from numerous dangers.

Those who are interested in heredity and in questions of transmitted qualities and tendencies, will find Freud unsatisfactory and Adler still more so. In this connection Prinzhorn writes: "In recent years it has been possible, in the face of all biological investigation of the facts, for an Alfred Adler, with a whole party of followers, to put forth the dogma that the hitherto

customary views on heredity are fundamentally false, that man is born as a *tabula rasa* whereon his environment makes impressions which, by means of education, one can direct at will, and according to capacity, towards any desired goal. According to Adler, there is no such thing as inborn talent or traits of disposition." Jung, as we have seen, lays great stress on inherited psychic qualities, but he makes no attempt to correlate these with physical characteristics. It is only Prinzhorn who unreservedly stresses the genetic factors in the psycho-somatic unity, and on this basis—if on no other—his work has a quality of completeness that cannot be claimed by any of the others.

The sociologist is likely to make his choice between Adler and Prinzhorn. To him the extremely individual emphasis of psycho-analysis may well act as a deterrent. For, though Freud uses phrases such as "what is most valuable in human culture" we find that this emerges from a "restless striving towards perfection" which "is easily explicable as the result of an expression of instinct." A social philosophy which, independent of valua-

tion, is ultimately reducible to instinctive motivation, can never command the complete approval of the more reflective critics. Jung's analytical psychology provides a picture of social adaptation which, though it differs entirely from the cold detachment of Freudian doctrine, nevertheless suggests *ἀνάγκη* rather than *ἔρως παιδαγωγός*. In Adler the less critical sociologist will encounter a satisfying—if somewhat naïf—gospel of social contribution ; a gospel that breathes co-operation and goodwill on a basis of rational purpose, all simplified to the last degree. In Prinzhorn the sociologist will meet with the familiar and basic problems of social philosophy, set forth in no spirit of easy optimism, nor yet treated as unimportant incidentals to the main purpose of psychotherapy. He will find the eternal problem of individual inheritance and social requirement set forth in convincing terms that stress, rather than evade, the limitations of psychological treatment.

To many readers it will appear that differences, such as exist between these various schools, should be susceptible of adjustment and that a system of psycho-

customary views on heredity are fundamentally false, that man is born as a *tabula rasa* whereon his environment makes impressions which, by means of education, one can direct at will, and according to capacity, towards any desired goal. According to Adler, there is no such thing as inborn talent or traits of disposition." Jung, as we have seen, lays great stress on inherited psychic qualities, but he makes no attempt to correlate these with physical characteristics. It is only Prinzhorn who unreservedly stresses the genetic factors in the psycho-somatic unity, and on this basis—if on no other—his work has a quality of completeness that cannot be claimed by any of the others.

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To many readers it will appear that differences, such as exist between these various schools, should be susceptible of adjustment and that a system of psycho-

pathology and psychotherapy should be evolved which would include the most valid features of each individual system. But such a hope or supposition would be illusory. Adler, it would seem, cannot be reconciled with any other writer. Crookshank states this in the following uncompromising terms : " The difference between Freud and Adler . . . is one which seems to render fatuous the notions of the well-meaning eclectics who say that they find a ' good deal of truth on both sides.' Such eclecticism is a kind of intellectual diplopia." It appears that Adler, as a " nominalist, vitalist and libertarian," can have nothing to do with a system of " realism, materialism and mechanism."

Similarly, Freud and his followers can make no terms with any other school, in that they are dealing exclusively with scientific fact—or so they suppose—and science can never yield a point to " metaphysical speculation," which is the phrase commonly used by Freudians to denote all non-Freudian opinion.

Jung has it to his credit that he freely admits that there are cases which can suitably be treated along Adlerian lines and

others that can be effectively submitted to a Freudian analysis. At the same time, he regards both systems as partial. Van der Hoop, in his *Character and the Unconscious*—a book that has not attracted the attention it deserves—has attempted a synthesis of Freud and Jung. But, as has been pointed out in an earlier passage, such attempts at compromise and reconciliation are foredoomed to failure in that the fundamental divergence between Freud and Jung represents a dividing line in human personality. Some will ever seek causative explanations and absolution; others will demand guidance, inspiration and the feeling of self-direction.

The following extract from a recent contribution of Hart's is relevant: "Adler and Jung, like Freud, offer causal interpretations of the phenomena, and their interpretations are similarly built on the psychological plane. All these three interpretations differ profoundly from one another. Are we to conclude from this that two at least must necessarily be wrong? I do not think so . . . each succeeds in illuminating some facets of those phenomena more satisfactorily than



his rivals. An analogy to this state of affairs can be found in the history of the theories of light. Newton's corpuscular hypothesis explained many of the phenomena of light; it was replaced by Young's undulatory hypothesis which explained most of the phenomena more efficiently, though some remained more comprehensible on Newton's view. These two conceptions were radically distinct and apparently incompatible, yet modern physics has succeeded by the aid of the theory of wave mechanics in incorporating these apparent incompatibles in a single unifying conception, and holds that a beam of light consists of discrete 'light-quanta,' which are at once corpuscles and waves. Such a happy fate may await the divergent approaches of the rival psychologists of to-day."

In concluding we cannot do better than reflect on the final passage of Mitchell's *Problems in Psychopathology*.

"Truth is many-sided. Observers stationed at different points along the seashore, when the moon is up, all see a ray of moonlight on the water; but no one observer can see, from where he stands,

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the light that seems so brilliant to his neighbour. So it may be that those who wrongly deny that any light is to be found where we are looking may yet themselves see some aspect of the truth which is hidden from our vision."

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